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Successive crises in the European Union have led critics to identify a pervasive tendency to emergency politics, where democratic deliberation gives way to policy decisions forced through by executive authority. By contrast, in this article it is argued that crises may stimulate deliberation and compromise, even when preceded by open conflict and an evident collective action failure. Drawing on a new dataset of 1759 policy-related actions covering the EU and its member states' responses to COVID-19 between March and July 2020, the timing, sequencing and origins of policy claims and steps are traced. Both urgent epidemiological responses are found, where emergency measures were in evidence; and responses to anticipated economic challenges that had to overcome disagreement concerning necessary institutional reforms. The findings depict a multifaceted crisis response. The European Commission acted swiftly but also bought time for member state governments to deliberate. This casts doubt on the many-crises-one-script account of EU emergency politics.

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How does the inherent norm of integration, notably to share risks among its members in good faith, become a self-sustaining practice? I address this question generally and for a critical case of a divisive institution, i.e. the evolution of sovereign bailout funding in the Euro Area since 2010. Community building between states is a potential outcome of solidaristic practices, reinforced by positive feedback processes. Inspired by Deborah Stone’s [Stone, D. A. (1999). Beyond moral hazard: Insurance as moral opportunity. Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, 6(1), 12–46] work on insurance, I demonstrate that there are social mechanisms at play that favour the secular expansion of risk sharing between states.

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