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We examine two important channels through which corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects firm value: investment efficiency and innovation. We find that firms with higher CSR performance invest more efficiently: these firms are less prone to invest in negative net present value (NPV) projects (overinvestment) and less prone to forego positive NPV projects (underinvestment). We also find that firms with higher CSR performance generate more patents and patent citations. Mediation analysis indicates that firms with higher CSR performance are more profitable and valuable, consequences partially attributable to efficient investments and innovation. These results, robust to alternate model specifications, lend support to enlightened stakeholder theory. K E Y W O R D Scorporate social responsibility, firm performance, innovation, investment efficiency, mediation ory. Porter and Kramer (2011) refer to a similar strategy as shared value creation. We refer to enlightened stakeholder theory throughout the paper to remain consistent and attribute this terminology to the similar ideas proposed by both sets of authors. 494

We thank Jim Hunton (editor), Steven Kachelmeier (senior editor), and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful guidance. We appreciate the helpful comments from Alberto Dorantes, Michael Ettredge, Robert Examining the Potential Benefits of Internal Control Monitoring TechnologyABSTRACT: We analyze the potential benefits that firms can realize from implementing technology specifically aimed at monitoring the effectiveness of their internal control systems. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission asserts that effective internal control monitoring should enhance the efficiency of internal control processes, and in turn, the assurance over such processes (COSO 2009a). We develop hypotheses to test the realization of these potential benefits. Specifically, we identify a sample of firms that implemented internal control monitoring technology in response to the internal control requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Consistent with our hypotheses, we document that the implementation of internal control monitoring technology is associated with lower likelihood of material weaknesses, smaller increases in audit fees, and smaller increases in audit delays during the post-SOX time period. We discuss the potential implications of our findings for research related to continuous monitoring, client-provided assurance assistance, and information technology governance.

We investigate involuntary chief financial officer (CFO) turnover following earnings restatements, the labor market penalties imposed on former restatement-firm CFOs, and whether these disciplinary consequences have increased following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Our results suggest that relative to a control group of non-restating firms, firms restating earnings have higher rates of involuntary CFO turnover, and that former restatement-firm CFOs face stiff labor market penalties. We generally find that the passage of SOX has not increased involuntary CFO turnover rates following restatements. However, we find that labor market penalties for former CFOs of restatement firms are more severe in the post-SOX period, suggesting that SOX has increased ex post settling-up costs. Our results suggest that the influence of SOX on the labor market has resulted in CFOs being held more accountable for their actions.