Existing series suggest wages in London were higher than in other European cities from 1650 to 1800. This article presents new evidence from the construction sites that supplied the underlying wage data, and uncovers the contractual and organizational context in which they were recorded. Institutional records of wages were profoundly affected by structural changes in the seventeenth century, particularly the emergence of large‐scale building contractors. The actual wages paid to London building workers were substantially below current estimates.

This paper provides new information and data on how work and pay actually operated for skilled and semiskilled men on large London construction projects in the early 1700s, and for the first time, offers detailed firm level evidence on the number of days per year worked by men. Construction workers' working days were bounded by structural factors of both supply and demand, men worked a far lower number of days than has been assumed until now. This has implications for our understanding of the 'industrious revolution', and industrialisation.

This article provides new information and data on the work and pay of skilled and semi-skilled men on a large London construction project in the early 1700s. It offers firm-level evidence on the employment relation in the construction industry at the time and sheds some light on the number of days worked per year and per week, showing that employment was more irregular and seasonal than current estimates of income infer. The patterns are considered in the context of new debates about industriousness and economic growth.

This article presents archival data on rebuilding costs and interest rates from the Corporation of London, 1666-83, to analyse how, in the absence of banking or capital market finance, the London Corporation funded the rebuilding of London after the Great Fire. The City borrowed from its citizens and outside investors at rates much lower than previously thought to replace vital services and to support large improvement works. Lenders were reassured by the Corporation's reputation, and its borrowing was partly secured by future coal tax receipts. The records show that funding from these sources was forthcoming and would have covered the costs. Most of the rebuilding was completed in less than a decade; but having invested in public goods without generating the expected flows of income in the form of improved fees, fines, and rents, the City defaulted in 1683. K E Y W O R D Scredible commitment, early modern finance, financial development, Great Fire of London, interest rate, municipal debt By 1666 London was as large outside the walls as it was within. When the Great Fire of London burned for a week and consumed almost the entire area of the old City, including the main public buildings, wharves, 87 parish churches, and St Paul's Cathedral, there were few deaths. Reportedly, more than 13 000 houses burnt down, and some 70 000 people were displaced. 1 Although the crisis created unprecedented challenges for the country as well as for the Corporation of London, the displacement and disaster relief were managed within the capability of 1 Strype, Survey of the cities. All subsequent quotations and estimates, including that of Brett-James, Growth of Stuart London, come from Strype, but it should be noted that all estimates of financial sums are calculated in rents, not in building costs.

No abstract