Using a randomized experiment in Chile, we study the impact role models have in the context of a training program for micro–entrepreneurs. We show that being in a group randomly chosen to be visited by a successful alumnus of the program increases household income one year after, mostly due to increased business participation and business income. We also randomized the provision of personalized “consulting sessions” vis–à–vis group sessions, and observe similar effects on income, with the role model intervention being significantly more cost-effective and better suited for less experienced businesses. (JEL J24, L25, L26, M53, O14, O15)

We propose a model to estimate the private benefits of control in control transfer transactions for a broad range of regulatory environments, from private negotiations to mandatory tender offers. The Barclay and Holderness' and Dyck and Zingales' Block Premium models are nested as special cases. With corporate control transfer regulation around the world moving from the Market Rule to the Equal Opportunity Rule, our theoretical model is a flexible tool for empirical studies. We apply our model to study the effect of the implementation of Chile's Tender Offer Law in 2000 and find that control premiums fell significantly. This drop is statistically unrelated to the targets' affiliation to an economic group. Our results suggest that improved corporate governance practices and the Equal Opportunity Rule alignment effect reduced the scope for extraction of private benefits of control.

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We randomly offer to workers in Chile personalized versus generalized information about their pension savings and forecasted pension income. Personalized information increased the probability and amounts of voluntary contributions after one year without crowding-out other forms of savings. Personalization appears to be very important: individuals who overestimated their pension at the time of the intervention saved more. Thus, a person's inability to understand how the pension system affects them may partially explain low pension savings.Despite the significant response to the intervention, its temporary nature and size suggest that information should be combined with other elements to increase its efficiency.

Research Summary We examine the relationship among inheritance taxes, shareholder protection, and the family firms' market value. Drawing on the family firm, corporate governance, and institutional complementarities literature, we argue that inheritance taxes act as external corporate governance mechanisms for decoupling business families' socioemotional goals. However, this depends upon minority investor protections. In strong protection countries, the incentives for family self‐governance created by high inheritance taxes are offset by the loss of business family autonomy inherent in strong shareholder protection. Using a sample of 284 firms across 31 countries, we provide support for these arguments. Results suggest that inheritance and shareholder protection laws are substitutive external corporate governance mechanisms to align business family and nonfamily shareholders' interests. Managerial Summary We investigate how inheritance taxes and shareholder protection laws interact to generate several outcomes that can benefit or harm family firms' market value. We argue that high rates of inheritance taxes in a country push business families to focus more on firm value maximization and less on pursuing family‐centric goals, thus increasing firm value. However, we further argue that the positive role of inheritance taxes on family firms' market value weakens when the country also exhibits strong shareholder protection laws. Therefore, inheritance and shareholder protection laws substitute for one another when they intersect in business families. We find evidence consistent with these ideas when examining a sample of publicly traded firms across 31 countries. Our results corroborate that policymakers' concerns regarding the protection of minority shareholders must not consider only investor protection laws, but also how investor protection interact with other institutions such as inheritance law.