The violation behavior of construction workers is an important cause of construction accidents. To reduce the violations of construction workers and to stimulate the supervision behavior of local governments and construction enterprises, an evolutionary game model is constructed in this paper. Then, the behavior choice mechanism of each player is analyzed. Finally, an incentive effect analysis method is put forward, and the incentive effects of different tax incentive mechanisms are analyzed. This research finds that only when the safety punishment imposed on construction workers is large enough does the supervision behavior of local governments and construction enterprises encourage construction workers to choose not to violate the regulation. Increasing the tax rate of a construction enterprise in the case of accidents can encourage the construction enterprise to supervise, but it inhibits the supervision behavior of the local government. A numerical simulation verifies the effectiveness of the incentive effect analysis method, which provides a new method for the incentive effect analysis of incentive mechanisms.

Improving the level of construction safety is an important task for stakeholders. How to balance the interests and reduce the conflicts between stakeholders has become the key factor in reducing accidents. To design incentive mechanisms that can not only improve the level of construction safety but also make the construction enterprise and construction workers mutually beneficial, differential game models under different incentive mechanisms are constructed. The study found that the greater the impact of construction workers’ safety efforts on the safety reward and punishment, the higher the level of construction safety. However, when construction workers’ efforts have too much impact on the reward and punishment, it is not conducive to the improvement of the income of the construction enterprise. The smaller the proportion of income allocated to the construction enterprise, the higher the level of construction safety. However, when the proportion of income obtained by the construction enterprise is too low, it is not conducive to the improvement of the income of the construction enterprise. The safety reward and punishment mechanism and the income sharing mechanism that meet specific conditions can make the construction enterprise and construction workers mutually beneficial. In addition, the level of construction safety and the income of the construction enterprise and construction workers under the combination mechanism composed of the reward and punishment mechanism and the income sharing mechanism is higher than that under a single mechanism.