Behavior Choice Mechanisms and Tax Incentive Mechanisms in the Game of Construction Safety

Liu, Jun; Wang, Xinhua; Liu, Tao

doi:10.3390/buildings12081078

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Trough the design of various corporate tax systems, the distortions in resource allocation in the industrial chain can be minimized [31,32], and the tax system can continuously optimize spatial resource allocation and enhance the performance of industrial upgrading as production becomes more specialized. In addition, the design of a local tax system that aligns with the development of urban clusters can signifcantly boost industrial upgrading and combat local protectionism and duplication of construction behaviors [33], thereby improving the efciency of the spatial division of labor [34,35]. While previous research treats taxes primarily as a source of government revenue [36,37], this study regards taxation as a crucial way for the government to play a key role in supply chains and industrial chains.…”

Section: Te Role and Benefts Of Government In Industrial Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game of Value Synergy in Industrial Chain: In the Context of “Chain Chief System”

Zhang,

Lu,

Luo

2023

Complexity

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The “chain chief system” is an institutional innovation that can enhance the responsibility of the industrial chain. Currently, various provinces and cities in China are adopting it to reap the benefits of resource combination. Traditional industrial synergy emphasizes “scale orientation,” and research on industrial policy, involving government administrative power, needs to be thoroughly discussed from the perspectives of government behavior and industry characteristics. This study utilizes the evolutionary game method to analyze the behavioral strategies of the government, leading enterprises, and other enterprises in the industrial chain under different conditions based on the perspective of value synergy. Relevant parameters of revenue and cost are modified for numerical simulation. The results demonstrate that the evolutionary stability strategy is influenced by various factors such as the government’s due diligence, subsidies, proportions allocated to different enterprises, benefits and costs, and industrial characteristics. Furthermore, the government can appropriately increase subsidies to leading enterprises and penalties for inaction, reduce barriers to data and scene sharing among enterprises in the industry, and lower industry concentration. These measures are more conducive to establish a “chain chief system” value synergy ecology in which all members actively participate.

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Section: Te Role and Benefts Of Government In Industrial Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game of Value Synergy in Industrial Chain: In the Context of “Chain Chief System”

Zhang,

Lu,

Luo

2023

Complexity

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“…Evolutionary Game Theory has been widely utilized to analyze practical issues within the construction safety supervision field [20,21], which is also suitable for this study. Contractors diligently manage workers in general, but may secretly employ the overaged when encountering labor shortage.…”

Section: Research Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supervisory Strategies for Overage Construction Workers: Considering the Contractor’s Risk Perception

Qin,

Zheng

2024

Buildings

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Overage construction workers have received widespread attention due to the higher safety risk. The balance of interests among the contractor, supervisor, and regulator forms a game, whose dynamics are tightly linked to the contractor’s risk perception. This study aims to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model with risk perception integrated, thus proposing tailored supervisory strategies for supervisors and regulators. Unlike the traditional scale-based approach, a behavior-based method is developed to measure the contractor’s risk perception, which improves the interpretability of results and avoids complex questionnaire surveys. The simulation results reveal a clear correlation between the contractor’s risk perception and behavior. It is recommended that supervisors increase penalties and the initial possibility of Rigorous Inspection properly, and regulators may consider enhancing credit-based future returns and losses. Notably, certain measures may not be applicable to all contractors. Hence, supervisors and regulators should identify their risk perception before adopting supervisory strategies.

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“…(4) The contractor's safety-related performance is linked to their economic interests, which can reduce the insurance rate for contractors with good safety production, thereby reducing the investment cost of enterprises and effectively encouraging contractors to improve their safety management level and safety performance. (5) The government can reward the owners according to whether the safety production of the construction project is good under the supervision of the owners, so as to encourage the owners to actively strengthen the safety supervision of the contractors, implement the safety supervision responsibilities, and improve the safety performance.…”

Section: Conclusion and Suggestionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such supervisions compel construction companies to passively accept safety standards with limited enthusiasm and incentives, and this limits their effect [2]. Therefore, many researchers have addressed the role of soft constraints/incentive mechanisms in safety supervision [3][4][5].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentives for Promoting Safety in the Chinese Construction Industry

Feng

Wang

Feng³

et al. 2023

Buildings

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Construction accidents occur frequently in China because the supervision of safety standards mandated by the government has not had its intended effect. In this paper, the authors propose a model to incentivize the management of safety during construction that involves the government as well as the owners and contractors in the industry. This study analyzes the principal–agent relationship involving each participant to determine their utility function and the minimum constraints on their participation, and uses this to obtain the optimal parameters to incentivize the management of safety during construction by solving for the ones related to the contractor’s effort and reward for their performance in the proposed model of incentives. Through the design of contractor incentive parameters and owner incentive parameters to further influence the government contractor and owner tripartite safety incentive model to make the model more perfect and in line with the development status of China. This study tested the proposed model using simulations. The results indicated that increasing the cost coefficient and level of the contractor’s effort increases their expected safety-related benefits, and increasing the coefficients of reward and punishment by the government reduces the contractor’s expected safety-related benefits. Moreover, the government can motivate the management of safety during construction by offering appropriate rewards and punishments. In particular, if the government increases incentives for safety, the safety-related benefits for owners and contractors decrease in the short term but increase significantly in the long term.

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Behavior Choice Mechanisms and Tax Incentive Mechanisms in the Game of Construction Safety

Cited by 6 publications

References 36 publications

Evolutionary Game of Value Synergy in Industrial Chain: In the Context of “Chain Chief System”

Evolutionary Game of Value Synergy in Industrial Chain: In the Context of “Chain Chief System”

Supervisory Strategies for Overage Construction Workers: Considering the Contractor’s Risk Perception

Incentives for Promoting Safety in the Chinese Construction Industry

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