The concept of affective scaffolding designates the various ways in which we manipulate the environment to influence our affective lives. In this article, I present a constructive critique of recent discussion on affective scaffolding. In Part 1, I summarize how the theories of situated mind and niche construction contribute to a multidimensional notion of scaffolding. In Part 2, I focus specifically on affective scaffolding and argue that current ambiguity over its distinctive criteria causes uncertainty as to how the concept can and should be used. In Part 3, I identify and examine two possible responses to the suggested state of conceptual ambiguity. The first, restrictive option is to keep pushing for more definite criteria. The second, permissive option is to embrace and work with a broad understanding of affective scaffolding. I argue that the latter choice is more pragmatic and productive. To conclude, I summarize where my examination leaves us in regard to ongoing theoretical work on affective scaffolding.

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We humans continuously reshape the environment to alter, enhance, and sustain our affective lives. This two‐way modification has been discussed in recent philosophy of mind as affective scaffolding, wherein scaffolding quite literally means that our affective states are enabled and supported by environmental resources such as material objects, other people, and physical spaces. In this article, I argue that under certain conditions, paintings function as noteworthy affective scaffolds to their creators. I begin with a theoretical overview of affective niche construction and affective scaffolding. Then, based on the criteria of robustness, concreteness, and dependability, I specify a more restricted, solid type of affective scaffolding and propound paintings as a cogent case of such. In support of my argument, I highlight two feelings typical to painterly creativity: the feeling of aesthetic resonance and the feeling of fusion. To conclude, I discuss the overall contributions and limitations of my account.

This article is a critical examination of Matthew Ratcliffe's theory of existential feelings. The notion of existential feelings has become increasingly salient in philosophical analyses of experience ranging from the psychopathological to the religio-mystical and moral (see e.g.

Despite its lengthy history in psychoanalysis, the psychological origins, essential features and value of the oceanic state remain open to dispute. This ambiguity has come at a cost to the clarity of theoretical discussions on the topic. In working towards a conceptual elucidation, the author maintains that there are three primary accounts of the oceanic state: the metaphysical one of Romain Rolland, the developmental one of Sigmund Freud, and the cognitive-perceptual one of Anton Ehrenzweig. Based on the notion of modal contact, he argues that the accounts share a general theoretical structure that establishes as the necessary criterion for all oceanic states the loosening of ego boundaries and sufficient contact between differentiated and undifferentiated modalities of the mind. However, within this common structure, the accounts employ dissimilar metapsychologies to promulgate oceanic states of appreciably distinct kinds. To support this view, the author carries out a comparative examination of the modal contacts involved in the primary accounts' oceanic states. To conclude, he reviews the main implications of the notion of modal contact vis-à-vis recent discussion on oceanic phenomena, and puts forward for consideration a pluralist account of the mind that can accommodate the existence of several kinds of oceanic states.