What can the concept of affective scaffolding do for us?

Saarinen, Jussi A.

doi:10.1080/09515089.2020.1761542

Cited by 32 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…With that background in place, I now turn to a more focused consideration of atmospheres and how they relate to agency. I will try to side-step some of the ontological puzzles mentioned above by thinking about atmospheres in the context of recent interdisciplinary approaches to situated cognition-and more precisely, situated affectivity (e.g., Colombetti and Krueger 2015;Colombetti and Roberts 2015;Griffiths and Scarantino 2009;Krueger 2014b;Saarinen 2020;Slaby 2014;Stephan, Walter, and Wilutzky 2014;von Maur 2021). For these situated approaches, moods, emotions, and other forms of affective experience are driven, manipulated, and sustainedover multiple timescales-by features of an individual's social and material environment.…”

Section: Atmospheres As Affective Arrangementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agency and atmospheres of inclusion and exclusion

Krueger¹

2021

Atmospheres and Shared Emotions

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Atmospheres seem to be everywhere. They are a central part of everyday life. We make decisions about who to spend time with, what to put on our walls, and where to eat based on atmospheres we associate with people, things, and spaces. In this way, atmospheres shape our experience and behavior. However, the link between atmospheres and agency has been relatively underexplored in the philosophical literature. Much of the debate instead concerns the nature of atmospheres, what sort of things they are.This focus on the ontology of atmospheres is a rich and philosophically substantive area of work.However, in what follows, I argue that it potentially overlooks important insights into the regulative power of atmospheres, that is, their capacity to shape the things we do and the ways we connect (or fail to connect) with others. Atmospheres do things. They actively shape experience and behavior-and crucially, they open up (or close down) forms of social connectedness. They do these things, I argue further, because atmospheres don't merely provide affective color or texture. They also furnish possibilities-possibilities that help or hinder us as we find our way in the world. I unpack this claim by considering atmospheres as "affective arrangements" (Slaby, Mühlhoff, and Wüschner 2017). Along the way, I develop a distinction between "atmospheres of inclusion" and "atmospheres of exclusion," and I apply this distinction to two case studies: Sara Ahmed's critical phenomenology of "stopped bodies," and social difficulties in autism. Both of these cases, I conclude, help to highlight the deep connection between atmospheres and agency. Preliminary RemarksWe often speak of atmospheres as though they pick out some well-defined entity-a quality, feature, attribute, or presence that attaches to the people, things, and spaces we encounter in everyday life. We talk about the tranquil atmosphere of a spring morning or lush park. A child can radiate an atmosphere of boundless curiosity, hope, innocence, and enthusiasm. The family dog can seem trusting and earnest or skittish and twitchy. A piece of music might emanate a somber or uplifting atmosphere. A classroom can feel lively and inclusive, or threatening and closed-off Forthcoming in Atmospheres and Shared Emotions, ed. Dylan Trigg. Routledge. 2to open inquiry. Some may experience a family dinner as authentic, loving, spontaneous, and warm; for others, it might feel grim and stilted. Homes, workplaces, churches and temples, restaurants, heritage sites, sports venues, stores, clubs, museums, theaters, factories, music venues, parks, cities, persons, activities, and communities-among many other things-are all said to have distinctive atmospheres.When we speak of atmospheres in everyday life, we generally don't simply take an aesthetic interest in them the way, say, we might view a work of art (although we can, of course, consider atmospheres from a purely aesthetic point of view). Our interest tends to be more concrete. This is because atmospheres aren't causally inert. They pervade ...

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Section: Atmospheres As Affective Arrangementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agency and atmospheres of inclusion and exclusion

Krueger¹

2021

Atmospheres and Shared Emotions

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“…First, following Sutton (2016) and Saarinen (2020), I suggest to distinguish between cognitive domains (e.g., reasoning, problem-solving, remembering) and affective domains (e.g., emotions, moods) of scaffolding (the domain aspect). While Clark (1997) and Sterelny (2010) focus on cognitive domains, more recent work has explored the affective domain.…”

Section: Specifying and Systematising Scaffolding Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, there are different kinds of environmental resources that can enter scaffolding relations (Saarinen 2020;Sutton 2016; see also Colombetti and Krueger 2015;Krueger 2020) (the resource aspect). We can distinguish between social resources (i.e., the behaviour and actions of other agents) and material resources (e.g., artefacts, tools).…”

Section: Specifying and Systematising Scaffolding Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Scaffolding can be described as a causal relationship between an environmental resource (the scaffold) and a mental capacity (the scaffolded). In philosophy, there have been many attempts to describe these scaffolding relations and to show how the embodied engagement with environmental resources influence our cognitive capacities (e.g., Clark 1997;Sterelny 2010;Sutton 2016) and our affective capacities (e.g., Colombetti and Krueger 2015;Saarinen 2020). However, in-depth examinations of concrete examples of scaffolding relations are scarce (for exceptions, see Maiese 2016;Saarinen 2019;Varga 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Narrative Scaffolding

Fabry

2021

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Mental capacities, philosophers of mind and cognition have recently argued, are not exclusively realised in brain, but depend upon the rest of the body and the local environment. In this context, the concept of 'scaffolding' has been employed to specify the relationship between embodied organisms and their local environment. The core idea is that at least some cognitive and affective capacities are causally dependent upon environmental resources. However, in-depth examinations of specific examples of scaffolding as test cases for current theorising about scaffolding have remained scarce. The aim of the current paper is to help close this gap. To this end, I will offer a characterisation of key aspects of 'scaffolding' that can help specify scaffolding relations. In a second step, I will analyse fictional textual narrative as a test case for accounts of cognitive and affective scaffolding. The key claim of this paper will be that fictional textual narrative can be considered as a scaffold that transforms our capacities in social understanding and empathising in the course of ontogeny.

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“…Así pues, mientras un filme presenta diferentes affordances a sus espectadores sobre la base de las formas de vida comunes para las personas; en la práctica -es decir, en las situaciones mismas de visualización-, el filme presenta solicitaciones puntuales para cada individuo de acuerdo con el SIF, o sea, con la estructura normativa que gobierna esa situación específica. En paralelo, los estados de preparación para la acción son estados psicológicos, normalmente irreflexivos, que simultáneamente reconocen-evalúan las solicitaciones del entorno, mientras suscitan el ajuste del comportamiento del individuo a la situación actual en curso (Saarinen, 2020). Según han expuesto los teóricos, en una amplia gama de casos, los estados de preparación para la acción toman la forma de alguna emoción (Dombroski, 2018;Gallagher, 2017;Korsakova-Kreyn, 2018;Lebois et al, 2018;Rietveld, 2008;Rietveld et al, 2018).…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

El ajuste situado hacia una obra audiovisual: el afinamiento de la sensibilidad mediada culturalmente

Espitia

Santamaría

2021

Prax. saber

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El marco de intencionalidad hábil [SIF] es una perspectiva que permite estudiar la cognición en prácticas socioculturales. Se trata de una aproximación ecológica que puede adaptarse para comprender las situaciones de enseñanza-aprendizaje. Este estudio tiene como objetivo lograr una aproximación al SIF del espectador académicamente involucrado con una obra de cine. Se realizó una experiencia etnográfica virtual, en la que se exploraron textos escritos por dos grupos de estudiantes de psicología académicamente involucrados con temas de estudio diferentes, a partir de la visualización de una obra de cine. Para el análisis cualitativo, se describieron los términos más frecuentes hallados en las producciones escritas de los estudiantes y se examinó la proximidad entre estos términos a través de análisis de conglomerados. Se propone una interpretación de las tendencias halladas, según la cual la sensibilidad de los participantes se ajusta a la observación de la obra de cine orientada por la configuración específica de las solicitaciones de cada práctica educativa. Las ideas de este estudio son relevantes para diseñar experiencias significativas de construcción de conocimiento en el aula.

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What can the concept of affective scaffolding do for us?

Cited by 32 publications

References 25 publications

Agency and atmospheres of inclusion and exclusion

Agency and atmospheres of inclusion and exclusion

Narrative Scaffolding

El ajuste situado hacia una obra audiovisual: el afinamiento de la sensibilidad mediada culturalmente

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