No abstract

A new system model reflecting the clustered structure of distributed storage is suggested to investigate interplay between storage overhead and repair bandwidth as storage node failures occur. Large data centers with multiple racks/disks or local networks of storage devices (e.g. sensor network) are good applications of the suggested clustered model. In realistic scenarios involving clustered storage structures, repairing storage nodes using intact nodes residing in other clusters is more bandwidth-consuming than restoring nodes based on information from intra-cluster nodes. Therefore, it is important to differentiate between intra-cluster repair bandwidth and cross-cluster repair bandwidth in modeling distributed storage. Capacity of the suggested model is obtained as a function of fundamental resources of distributed storage systems, namely, node storage capacity, intra-cluster repair bandwidth and cross-cluster repair bandwidth. The capacity is shown to be asymptotically equivalent to a monotonic decreasing function of number of clusters, as the number of storage nodes increases without bound. Based on the capacity expression, feasible sets of required resources which enable reliable storage are obtained in a closed-form solution. Specifically, it is shown that the cross-cluster traffic can be minimized to zero (i.e., intra-cluster local repair becomes possible) by allowing extra resources on storage capacity and intra-cluster repair bandwidth, according to the law specified in the closed-form. The network coding schemes with zero crosscluster traffic are defined as intra-cluster repairable codes, which are shown to be a class of the previously developed locally repairable codes.

Coding for distributed computing supports lowlatency computation by relieving the burden of straggling workers. While most existing works assume a simple master-worker model, we consider a hierarchical computational structure consisting of groups of workers, motivated by the need to reflect the architectures of real-world distributed computing systems. In this work, we propose a hierarchical coding scheme for this model, as well as analyze its decoding cost and expected computation time. Specifically, we first provide upper and lower bounds on the expected computing time of the proposed scheme. We also show that our scheme enables efficient parallel decoding, thus reducing decoding costs by orders of magnitude over non-hierarchical schemes. When considering both decoding cost and computing time, the proposed hierarchical coding is shown to outperform existing schemes in many practical scenarios.

Federated learning has been spotlighted as a way to train neural networks using data distributed over multiple nodes without the need for the nodes to share data. Unfortunately, it has also been shown that data privacy could not be fully guaranteed as adversaries may be able to extract certain information on local data from the model parameters transmitted during federated learning. A recent solution based on the secure aggregation primitive enabled privacypreserving federated learning, but at the expense of significant extra communication/computational resources. In this paper, we propose communicationcomputation efficient secure aggregation which substantially reduces the amount of communication/computational resources relative to the existing secure solution without sacrificing data privacy. The key idea behind the suggested scheme is to design the topology of the secret-sharing nodes as sparse random graphs instead of the complete graph corresponding to the existing solution. We first obtain the necessary and sufficient condition on the graph to guarantee reliable and private federated learning in the information-theoretic sense. We then suggest using the Erdős-Rényi graph in particular and provide theoretical guarantees on the reliability/privacy of the proposed scheme. Through extensive real-world experiments, we demonstrate that our scheme, using only 20 ∼ 30% of the resources required in the conventional scheme, maintains virtually the same levels of reliability and data privacy in practical federated learning systems.

Due to its decentralized nature, Federated Learning (FL) lends itself to adversarial attacks in the form of backdoors during training. The goal of a backdoor is to corrupt the performance of the trained model on specific sub-tasks (e.g., by classifying green cars as frogs). A range of FL backdoor attacks have been introduced in the literature, but also methods to defend against them, and it is currently an open question whether FL systems can be tailored to be robust against backdoors. In this work, we provide evidence to the contrary. We first establish that, in the general case, robustness to backdoors implies model robustness to adversarial examples, a major open problem in itself. Furthermore, detecting the presence of a backdoor in a FL model is unlikely assuming first order oracles or polynomial time. We couple our theoretical results with a new family of backdoor attacks, which we refer to as edge-case backdoors. An edge-case backdoor forces a model to misclassify on seemingly easy inputs that are however unlikely to be part of the training, or test data, i.e., they live on the tail of the input distribution. We explain how these edge-case backdoors can lead to unsavory failures and may have serious repercussions on fairness, and exhibit that with careful tuning at the side of the adversary, one can insert them across a range of machine learning tasks (e.g., image classification, OCR, text prediction, sentiment analysis).