This article contends that the relation of early logical empiricism to Kant was more complex than is often assumed. It argues that Reichenbach's early work on Kant and Einstein, entitled

This article contends that Kant's account of the schemata of pure concepts is pivotal to his critique of Wolffian metaphysics and, hence, to the Critique of Pure Reason as a whole. Opposing the common view that categories are prior to schemata, I argue that Kant considers a priori schematization to occur wherever the human mind unifies a given manifold, except in the purported a priori cognition to which Wolffian metaphysics aspired. I take Kant to hold, accordingly, that transcendental schemata and categories represent different guises of the a priori rules that allow the mind to unify a manifold. Since transcendental schemata present these rules as ways of unifying successive representations, they can be said to constitute the sensible condition of any a priori cognition of objects. As Kant argues, the categories that underly Wolffian metaphysics abstract from this condition, which entails that the a priori rules at stake do not extend to the soul, the world as such and God, but can only be used with regard to possible objects of experience.

No abstract

This article challenges the prevailing interpretations of Hegel's account of the concept "contradiction" in the Science of Logic by arguing that it is concerned with the principle of Hegel's method rather than with the classical law of non-contradiction. I first consider Hegel's Doctrine of Essence in view of Kant's discussion of the concepts of reflection in the first Critique . On this basis, I examine Hegel's account of the logical principles based on the concepts "identity," "opposition," and "contradiction." Finally, I point out how the principle Hegel derives from the concept of contradiction actually informs his own method.

No abstract