Standard models of sexual consent in sexual violence prevention campaigns suppose that women, as free and autonomous agents, are in control of their sexuality and are able to 'just say no' to unwanted sex. In this article, we suggest that the 'just say no' approach to sexual consent is deeply problematic in light of the contradictory ways in which women's empowerment is assumed within postfeminist discourses whilst masking ongoing gender imbalances. In addition, we problematise neoliberalist notions of the inherently free and hyper-responsible citizen by highlighting the persistence of sociostructural constraints on young women's sexual decision-making. We draw on an analysis of interviews with eight young women aged between 18 and 24 about their perceptions and experiences of everyday negotiations of consent in their casual and intimate sexual relationships with men.

Over the course of the 2000s, Australia has been at the international forefront of implementing child-inclusive services to families undergoing separation (Birnbaum, 2009). Around the world, various policy initiatives and research projects have suggested that the direct participation of children in family separation processes correctly recognises the child’s right to be heard in matters of direct relevance to them. This article reports on the findings of a study which involved the interviewing of children and parents participating in family separation mediation in Australia. The key findings were that for most children their inclusion in the mediation was either unremarkable or beneficial in some important ways, however in a small number of cases involving family violence and/or anger, their inclusion sparked fear in children. We conclude that child inclusive separation processes must recognize the pervasiveness of family violence and balance the right of children to be heard with traditional welfare principles regarding the protection of children.

The article uses Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 as a case study in the historical and cultural construction of the legitimacy of armed force. The discussion develops the concept of a 'moral economy of violence' which suggests that the legitimacy that state leaders and their publics take for granted in the use of military force is dependent on a variety of historically and culturally contingent beliefs and assumptions. In the case of the first Lebanon War, the key components of the Israeli moral economy of violence included faith in the technologically superior means by which the Israeli army conducted itself, a belief in the efficiency of military combat, and a widely held notion of Lebanon as an Oriental version of the lawless Wild West.

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