Consider a database of academic papers where each paper has a scientific worth and a group of authors. We propose a new way of measuring individual academic productivity by evaluating authorship, the extent of an author's contribution to each paper. Our method, CoScore, uses the varying levels of success of all academic partnerships to infer, simultaneously, overall individual productivity and authorship: the worth of a paper is distributed proportionally to each co-author's productivity, defined as the sum of her contributions to all papers. The CoScores of all authors are determined endogenously via the solution of a fixed point problem. We show that CoScore is well-defined and that it is uniquely characterized by three properties: consistency, invariance to merging papers, and invariance to merging scholars. We illustrate CoScore for the two thousand most cited papers in economics.

We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof and unanimous mechanisms satisfying a coherence property and responding well to changes in the availability of resources. These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms (Young, 1987), some of which date back to the Babylonian Talmud.

Consider a market for a resource under disequilibrium prices where suppliers and demanders are privately informed about their optimal supply and consumption levels. Strategy-proof market clearing mechanisms give suppliers and demanders dominant strategy incentives to truthfully reveal this information. We describe the class of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms responding well to changes in supplies and demands, as formalized by the "replacement principle" (Thomson, 2007). Since no symmetry or anonymity conditions are imposed, these mechanisms can implement a wide array of distributional objectives in both indivisible and divisible resource allocation situations. These mechanisms apply to allocation problems involving network constraints modeling necessary conditions for a transfer of the resource from a supplier to a demander.