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We propose a new method to disentangle individual from team productivity, CoScore. CoScore uses the varying membership and levels of success of all teams to simultaneously infer an individual’s productivity and her credit for each of her teams’ successes. Crucially, the productivities of all individuals are determined endogenously via the solution of a fixed point problem. We show that CoScore is well defined, and we provide axiomatic foundations for the inferred credit allocation. We illustrate CoScore in scientific research and sports. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, decision analysis.

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We study the fair allocation of a one-dimensional and perfectly divisible good when individuals have other-regarding preferences. Assuming no legitimate claims and purely ordinal preferences, how should society measure social welfare so as to satisfy basic principles of efficiency and fairness? We define the egalitarian equivalent as the size of the egalitarian allocation which leaves the individual indifferent to the current allocation. In two simple models of average and positional externalities, we characterize the class of social preferences which give full priority to the individual with the lowest egalitarian equivalent in the economy.

Consider a database of academic papers where each paper has a scientific worth and a group of authors. We propose a new way of measuring individual academic productivity by evaluating authorship, the extent of an author's contribution to each paper. Our method, CoScore, uses the varying levels of success of all academic partnerships to infer, simultaneously, overall individual productivity and authorship: the worth of a paper is distributed proportionally to each co-author's productivity, defined as the sum of her contributions to all papers. The CoScores of all authors are determined endogenously via the solution of a fixed point problem. We show that CoScore is well-defined and that it is uniquely characterized by three properties: consistency, invariance to merging papers, and invariance to merging scholars. We illustrate CoScore for the two thousand most cited papers in economics.