Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment

Macé, Antonin; Treibich, Rafael

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.007

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…For instance, in an assembly where decisions are taken under simple majority rule, a cohesive group of 51% obviously has more than a ‘fair’ share. Principles of justice indicate that, for decision bodies governed by majority rule, fair apportionment should follow a norm of degressive proportionality (Koriyama et al, 2013; Laslier, 2012; Macé and Treibich, 2012). In fact, degressive proportional apportionments can often be observed in parliaments that gather districts, regions, or states of very different sizes, such as the European Parliament.…”

Section: Degressive Proportionality and Election Thresholdsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods

Brill

Laslier

Skowron

2018

Journal of Theoretical Politics

101

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We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that they induce apportionment methods that are well-established in the literature on proportional representation. For instance, we show that Proportional Approval Voting induces the D'Hondt method and that Monroe's rule induces the largest remainder method. We also consider properties of apportionment methods and exhibit multiwinner rules that induce apportionment methods satisfying these properties.

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Section: Degressive Proportionality and Election Thresholdsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods

Brill

Laslier

Skowron

2018

Journal of Theoretical Politics

101

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“…A lot of research is also focused on one of the most important proposals developed in 2011 by the participants of the scientific meeting held at the instigation of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament (AFCO) at the Centre for Mathematical Sciences, University of Cambridge. The papers such as Cegiełka et al (2019), Duff (2012), Grimmett (2012), Grimmett et al (2012), Habermas (2017, Haman (2017), Laslier (2012), Łyko and Rudek (2017), Macé and Treibich (2012), Moberg (2012), Grimmett (2018), Policy Department (2017) and Słomczyński and Życzkowski (2012) deal with this subject among other things.…”

Section: Review Of Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

A neutral core of degressively proportional allocations under lexicographic preferences of agents

et al. 2021

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One of the main problems of practical applications of degressively proportional allocations of goods and burdens is lack of uniqueness of this principle. Even under given boundary conditions of allocation, i.e. determined minimal and maximal amounts of a good that can be assigned in a given allocation, there are usually many feasible solutions. The lack of formal rules of allocation is the reason why the allocation is typically a result of negotiations among its agents. A number of allocations favor some of agents or their groups, therefore other agents cannot accept them. The aim of this paper is to indicate a way of reducing the set of all feasible solutions exclusively to those that are neutral to all agents. As a result of the term of lexicographic preference of allocation agents defined on the basis of the relation theory followed by a numerical analysis of sets of all feasible solutions, it is possible to determine a core of this set in the form of a subset of all feasible solutions that are acceptable by all agents. In addition, this subset can be further divided into smaller subsets with regard to the degree of acceptance of their elements. Theoretical analysis is complemented by case studies, one of which is application of this idea to the allocation of seats in the European Parliament among the member states of the European Union.

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“…Se zájmem o tuto tematiku se tak v současnosti můžeme setkat především v řadách matematiků, kteří se ve svém výzkumu zabývají vztahem matematiky a demokracie, respektive matematickými společenskými vědami (např. Ramírez González, Palomarez, Márquez 2006 Grimmett, Oelbermann, Pukelsheim 2012;Kellermann 2012;Laslier 2012;Macé, Treibich 2012;Ramírez-González 2012;Ramírez-González, Martínez-Aroza, Márquez García 2012;Serafini 2012;Słomczyński, Życzkowski 2012). V převážné většině případů se ale autoři zaměřují především na porovnávání výhod a nevýhod různých metod přerozdělování mandátů, přičemž zastřešující ambicí těchto studií je snaha o nalezení vhodného, politicky nestranného, a přitom co možná nejlepšího či nejpřesnějšího matematického algoritmu, jenž by byl v souladu s požadavky vyplývajícími z platné unijní legislativy.…”

Section: Současný Stav Poznáníunclassified

Zastoupení členských zemí v Evropském parlamentu po volbách 2019

Charvát¹

2020

AFF

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Modern democratic political systems are hardly conceivable without political representation. This also applies to the European Union, a unique international organisation with a directly elected and fully-fledged assembly representing the EU citizens. Because geography is central to the operation of almost all electoral systems and the European Parliament is the first transnational assembly based on the Member States representation, the paper explores the spatial aspect of the composition of the European Parliament resulting from the 2019 election. The representation in the European Parliament may be degressively proportional, which implies malapportionment of seats across the EU Member States. The paper, thus, seeks to quantify the malapportionment in the 2019 election at both the aggregate level (by the adaption of Loosemore and Hanby's distortion index) and individual level (advantage ratio and the value of a vote). It concludes malapportionment was just below 14,5 % of the total seats in 2019 while the 2019 election did not bring the degressively proportional representation in the European Parliament as required by the Lisbon Treaty.

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Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment

Cited by 11 publications

References 11 publications

Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods

Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods

A neutral core of degressively proportional allocations under lexicographic preferences of agents

Zastoupení členských zemí v Evropském parlamentu po volbách 2019

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