This comprehensive introduction to early Chinese philosophy covers a range of philosophical traditions which arose during the Spring and Autumn (722-476 BCE) and Warring States (475-221 BCE) periods in China, including Confucianism, Mohism, Daoism and Legalism. It considers concepts, themes and argumentative methods of early Chinese philosophy and follows the development of some ideas in subsequent periods, including the introduction of Buddhism into China. The book examines key issues and debates in early Chinese philosophy, cross-infl uences between its traditions and interpretations by scholars up to the present day. The discussion draws upon both primary texts and secondary sources, and there are suggestions for further reading. This will be an invaluable guide for all who are interested in the foundations of Chinese philosophy and its richness and continuing relevance.
This comprehensive introductory textbook to early Chinese philosophy covers a range of philosophical traditions which arose during the Spring and Autumn (722–476 BCE) and Warring States (475–221 BCE) periods in China, including Confucianism, Mohism, Daoism, and Legalism. It considers concepts, themes and argumentative methods of early Chinese philosophy and follows the development of some ideas in subsequent periods, including the introduction of Buddhism into China. The book examines key issues and debates in early Chinese philosophy, cross-influences between its traditions and interpretations by scholars up to the present day. The discussion draws upon both primary texts and secondary sources, and there are suggestions for further reading. This will be an invaluable guide for all who are interested in the foundations of Chinese philosophy and its richness and continuing relevance.
In Daoist philosophy, the self is understood as an individual interdependent with others, and situated within a broader environment. Within this framework, the concept ziran is frequently understood in terms of naturalness or nature while wuwei is explained in terms of non-oppressive government. In many existing accounts, little is done to connect these two key Daoist concepts. Here, I suggest that wuwei and ziran are correlated, ethical, concepts. Together, they provide a unifying ethical framework for understanding the philosophy of the Daodejing. I explore the meaning of ziran as self-so-ness or, in human terms, as pertaining to an individual's spontaneity. The appropriate response to the spontaneity of individuals is to avoid, insofar as possible, imposing or using restrictive norms and methods, that is, wuwei. According to this view, ziran and wuwei offer an account of ethics that attends to core notions of interdependent selfhood, including mutuality, relationality, interdependence, symbiosis, and responsiveness. A significant proportion of contemporary scholarly debate on the Daodejing 道德經 focuses on its skepticism of existing ethical and social norms. These include its rejection of conventional views of knowledge, wisdom, cultivation, and status (Daodejing 5, 18, 19, 20). Hence, a discussion of ethics in the Daodejing may seem almost a misdirected enterprise. In this article, I suggest that the concepts ziran 自然 and wuwei 無為 support an ethic that is grounded in the interdependent relationality of individuals. However, this ethic is not presented in terms of norms, rules, or principles. It is an other-regarding attitude and in that sense we may say that it is more fundamental than these other manifestations of ethical commitment. I suggest that the concepts ziran and wuwei, taken together, emphasize Dao (2007) 6:325-337
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We enable the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. CONFUCIAN MORAL THINKING There are many problems associated with studying non-Western philosophy from within a Western philosophical framework.' There is abundant literature on the differences between the two systems, in their categorization of fields and topics of study, their ways of life, their concerns, their methodologies, and their forms of thought. Apart from the initial difficulties often encountered in translation, one needs also to understand and analyze a philosophy within its historical context. This is especially true of the study of ways of thinking about morality, since moral norms are connected with and rooted in assumptions and in the value systems specific to sociocultural contexts. Indeed, there is no equivalent of the term 'moral' in classical Chinese.2 The definition of abstract and metaphysical concepts without simultaneously considering their practical manifestations is nonexistent in the classical Confucian tradition. It will be shown in this essay that, within the Confucian context, moral rules do not have ultimacy in human life in the sense that moral norms cannot be construed as universal, impartial, objective principles. This, as Rosemont suggests, is unlike the case of contemporary 'Western' moral philosophy: ... the term 'morals' is almost uniformly taken as circumscribing the culturally specific concept-cluster listed above [i.e., freedom, liberty, autonomy, individual, utility, rationality, objective, subjective, choice, dilemma, duty, rights, and ought], now referred to as "rights-based" theories and principles. In the several and varied accounts put forward by writers in this field, moral issues involve the weighing of rational arguments on behalf of putative universal principles, which are possible options for guiding the specific actions of freely choosing, autonomous individuals. In this field the early Confucians, along with most other nonwestern thinkers, will not be found; nor, for that matter, will Aristotle.... It is by no means just the early Chinese we will fundamentally misunderstand if we impose the concept cluster of contemporary western moral philosophy on ancient texts.3 Apart from presuppositions made regarding human free will, individualism, and autonomy, 'Western' views often construct morality on an individualistic basis whereby more weight is assigned to the character, virtue, or behavior of the individual moral agent than to the interests and lives of other agents. They focus on what each person, qua moral agent, does, rather than on what the community as a whole does together. The latter is one of the primary characteristics of Confucian thought. Thus, in examining a philosophy that crosses cultural and ...
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