We examine how investors value tax avoidance (measured as the level of cash effective tax rates [ETRs]) and tax risk (measured as the volatility of cash ETRs), and how these constructs interact to influence firm value. Our results suggest that investors positively value tax avoidance but negatively value tax risk and, most importantly, that greater tax risk moderates the positive valuation of tax avoidance. In additional analyses, we find that contemporaneous measures of tax avoidance and tax risk provide insight into future tax cash flows and that our results hold using GAAP ETR-based measures of tax avoidance and tax risk. Finally, our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks including controlling for idiosyncratic and systematic risk, the cost of equity capital, and unrecognized tax benefits in the post-FIN 48 period, among others. Broadly, our findings provide new evidence on how taxes affect firm value and suggest that tax avoidance and tax risk should be considered jointly rather than in isolation.
This study examines (1) whether network ties help explain variation in tax avoidance, and (2) how the relation between network ties and tax avoidance varies depending on the nature and context of those ties. We posit that information on a range of tax-avoidance strategies is shared among firms through their social network connections. Using board interlocks to proxy for these connections, we find that firms with greater board ties to low-tax firms have lower cash ETRs themselves. Ties to low-tax firms are more influential when the focal firm and its network partner are operationally and strategically similar, as are ties created by executive directors. Board ties to low-tax firms are also more influential when the focal firm and its network partner engage the same local auditor. Overall, our results suggest that the influence of firms' network ties on their tax-avoidance behavior depends on the character of those ties.
Empirical evidence linking campaign financing activity to future firm benefits is mixed. However, theory suggests that an important aspect of a successful political strategy is a multi-period investment in cultivating relationships with key policymakers (Snyder 1992). We examine a specific setting and investigate whether firms that invest in relationships with tax policymakers via campaign contributions accrue greater future tax benefits. We find that firms that pursue a more relational approach to corporate political activity have lower future cash and GAAP effective tax rates (ETRs) and less volatile future cash ETRs. Further, we provide evidence of an incremental effect of tax-specific lobbying for firms that develop stronger relationships with tax policymakers via PAC support. Thus, our study links tax-specific PAC support to tax-specific outcomes, providing an economic link for the observed contribution-return relation documented in Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010).
Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources as indicated in the text.
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