The international community is as ubiquitous as it is elusive and its universalist pretensions remain unchallenged in political and academic discourse. In response, this article turns to Bottici's work on political myths. Against the notion of myths as falsehoods, we argue that they create their own sphere of shared social and political reality. The analysis centres on the case of Cambodia, a country that served as an experiment of liberal interventionism. It draws on archival and field research on two consecutive international interventions, a review of public statements by international actors, and interviews with Cambodian actors and activist. We argue that to understand the ideas actors use to orient themselves as they press for change, it is necessary to consider how decades of engagement with the myth have shaped the political imaginary. Our empirical analysis points to three different phases in the use of the myth: Its production during UNTAC, the reinforcement of its narratives through subsequent legal, aid and development interventions, and finally its contemporary use in a post-liberal context. We observe that Cambodian actors increasingly engage the myth to question the terms of transnational cooperation for democracy. Our work has implications for assessments of the legacies of liberal peacebuilding.

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Internationale Administrationen stellen eine extreme Form des internationalen state building dar. 1 In ihnen übernehmen internationale Akteure für einen gewissen Zeitraum die Kontrolle über ein Territorium, bis dieses schließlich in die Hände einer demokratisch, d.h. in der Regel durch Wahlen legitimierten Regierung übergeben werden kann. Nicht ganz zu Unrecht werden sie in eine Kontinuität mit den Dekolonialisierungsverwaltungen gerückt, die ebenfalls darauf zielten, staatliche Souveränität herzustellen (Bain 2003: 149;Wilde 2008). Dennoch unterscheiden sich beide Formen des externen state building vor allem im Hinblick auf diejenigen, die die Treuhänderschaft über das Territorium und damit über die dort lebende Bevölkerung überantwortet bekamen: Während die Dekolonialisierungsverwaltungen in der Regel von den ehemaligen Kolonialstaaten geleitet wurden, handelt es sich bei den Übergangsverwaltungen, die seit den 1990er Jahren von den Vereinten Nationen eingesetzt wurden, um multinationale Akteure, denen im Gegensatz zu den ehemaligen Kolonialstaaten kein eigenes Interesse am Staatsaufbau zugeschrieben wird.

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While the ‘emotion turn’ has emerged as an influential analytical lens in International Relations (IR), there is not yet a well-developed understanding of the role that emotions play in facilitating or inhibiting peace. This special issue of Cooperation and Conflict engages with the analytical potential of emotions and the promise this perspective holds for innovative analyses of peace processes and peacebuilding. To demonstrate the political significance of emotions to peace, the contributors explore how emotions shape the bounds and boundaries of actors and alliances committed to fostering peaceful societies. This introductory article offers possible avenues to leverage the analytical potential of IR’s emotions agenda to engage with peace and peacebuilding. First, we discuss how the emotions agenda contributes to the conversation about what peace is and should look like. Second, we argue that emotions can help us to articulate peace as an embodied knowledge of complex socio-political relations and power dynamics. To visualize ‘peace’ without the permanent contrast of violence, we mobilize this perspective to illuminate actors’ practices and the constraints they face in the pursuit of a peaceful political order. Third, we discuss what an emotions agenda for peace might entail for critical and constructive peacebuilding studies.