The European Union has made cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia a crucial condition to furthering relations with Serbia. This approach, known as “icty conditionality”, stems from the conviction that the Tribunal is a key factor in rebuilding the rule of law in the Western Balkans. In contrast to the existing literature on eu conditionality in general or on icty conditionality in specific, this article emphasizes the relevance of all involved actors: it examines the interaction of icty conditionality, domestic factors and the icty’s judicial performance influencing the development of the rule of law in Serbia. The article concludes that the goal of using the icty as a tool to establish the rule of law in Serbia has failed due to a lack of norm diffusion, although all icty conditionality requirements have eventually formally been fulfilled. This was not only due to inconsistent application of icty conditionality on the eu’s side, but also on account of deficiencies in the legal operation of the Tribunal. Lastly, neither the eu’s demands nor the icty’s work fell on fruitful domestic grounds.

No abstract

No abstract

While much attention has been paid to contributions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law, the ICTY’s impact on countries under its jurisdiction and on their criminal justice systems is under-researched. Using Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Serbia as case studies, this chapter discusses the Tribunal’s influence on fairness in war crimes trials that have been conducted in the region since the early 2000s. It shows that the ICTY had only scarce effects on fairness of proceedings, with great impact in BiH and almost absent in Serbia. The difference is explained using the ‘norm cascade model’ and ‘spiral model’, describing how a norm ‘cascades’ from the international level into the national justice system. It shows that the ICTY’s permanent presence in BiH and large absence in Serbia were factors accounting for whether national counterparts followed ICTY jurisprudence and practice.

No abstract