Judicial independence did not only become more visible in the recent case law of the Court of justice but has also been analysed as a systemic parameter of the Union. This article discusses a sample of three cases, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Achmea, and L.M., to assess the notion of judicial independence as applying regarding the national judges in the judicial system of the Union. Judicial independence, as a notion of EU law, is primarily a constitutional requirement presumably deferent to Member States’ standards and pursuing the proper functioning of the Union’s judicial system, namely its effectiveness. However, the recent case law testifies the emergence of a common EU standard of judicial independence, which does not only apply as a minimum standard throughout the Union but also affects the national legal orders. Ultimately, the analyses of the paper point out a curious harmony regarding judicial independence between the principles of effectiveness of Union law and of effective judicial protection under that law without clarifying their articulation. Judicial Independence, Effective Judicial Protection, Rule of law, Structural Requirement, effectiveness, common standard, Judicial System of the Union, Constitutionalization of the EU.

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Aiming to foster reflection on the role of the EU regarding the enforcement of the rule of law, this essay revisits, in a normative fashion, the Union’s legal system with references to recent and established case law and literature. It understands the judicial enforcement of the rule of law as a synonym of effective judicial protection and analyses the pluralistic system of the Union as being overarched by loyalty. It then introduces three specific components of the rule of law related to its judicial enforcement. The first concerns its material aspect: the standards of protection of rights and principles. The contribution opines that the systemic analysis of the Union excludes conflicts of standards. The second component refers to judicial control. It is argued that the related structural obligations of the Member States are enforceable by individual claims grounded on a self-standing right. The last component is organic and relates to the judge. The contribution posits that the national judge is empowered by her European mandate to enforcing the rule of law. While the technique of exceptional circumstances as part of the mechanism of the European arrest warrant confirms this position, cases of constitutional conflicts suggest the procedural deficiency. EU legal system, rule of law, effective judicial protection, judicial enforcement of the rule of law, multidimensional legal system, substantive loyalty, standards of protection, procedural loyalty, duties of the Member States, individual claims, European mandate of the national judge, judicial cooperation, preliminary ruling, exceptional circumstances, constitutional conflicts