This essay provides an up-to-date summary of the findings of the literature on the economics of alliances. We show that the study of the economics of alliances has played a pivotal role in understanding and applying public good analysis to real-world applications. We establish that the manner in which alliances address burden sharing and allocative issues is related to strategic doctrines, weapon technology, perceived threats, and membership composition. Past contributions are evaluated, and areas needing further development are identified. The theoretical and empirical knowledge gained from the study of alliances is shown to be directly applicable to a wide range of international collectives.

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Popular belief is that ownership change (from public to private) brings about improved performance. But (i) ownership displays a spectrum, not an either/or; (ii) degree of competition is conceptually and often actually independent of ownership; and (iii) so is change‐of‐ownership's assumed instruments for improving performance, change in managerial incentive structures and reporting structures. The article surveys the relevant theories, popular and scholarly, and develops models for testing the relationships between status change (ownership) and performance (indices of productivity, profitability etc.), and between status change and internal organizational change (indices of reorganization and of linkage), in a small number of British organizations which underwent change in recent decades. Preliminary results of one or two analyses illustrate the methods and the possibilities.

NATO is facing major changes and challenges: enlargement, new threats, new missions, new technology, and declining defence budgets. These developments raise the question of who will pay for the changes and hence the possibility of new burden-sharing debates. burden-sharing was a focus of controversy in the past and it could re-emerge in the future. A variety of burden-sharing measures are reviewed. These range from such traditional indicators as the share of defence in GDP to a range of alternative military measures as well as civil indicators, such as contributions to UN humanitarian operations and economic aid. Burden-sharing debates are affected by choice of indicator. Different indicators give different rankings and results. Nations will select the indicator(s) which show that they are bearing an `unfairly' high burden of the collective defence effort. The final part of the article examines the likely developments in burden-sharing over the next decade (e.g. new missions, new technology, enlargement). On enlargement, emphasis is placed on the need to assess both the benefits and costs of NATO expansion and the conclusion focuses on the optimal size of NATO.