Addressing fake news requires a multidisciplinary effort

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Stephen Stedman introduced a typology of "civil war spoilers," deªned as "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it." 1 A key contribution of Stedman's article was to focus attention on the relatively underappreciated role of elites in the negotiation and implementation of peace processes. In so doing, Stedman sought to develop a more nuanced and descriptively comprehensive theory of intrastate conºict that moved beyond the primarily structural and abstract focus that had theretofore dominated the study of internal wars and ethnic conºict. 2 By reintroducing the role of individual decisionmakers into the analysis of the stability of peace accords, Stedman added signiªcantly to the understanding of the dynamics of intrastate wars, as well as enriched and expanded the debate on the causes of ethnic conºict. We recognize the signiªcant contribution made by Stedman and those who have adopted his "spoilers" framework. 3

In 2015, over one million refugees and migrants arrived in Europe, laying bare the limitations of the EU's common border control and burden-sharing systems. This article examines consequences of the EU's disjoint, schizophrenic and, at times, hypocritical responses to what has become known as the European migration crisis. It explains how unilateral, national-level responses have made the EU as a whole particularly susceptible to a unique brand of coercive bargaining that relies on the threat (or actual generation) of mass population movements as a non-military instrument of state-level coercion. After outlining who employs this kind of foreign policy tool, to what ends, and under what circumstances, the article offers an illustration of this kind of coercion in action, by analyzing the March 2016 deal between the EU and Turkey. The article concludes with a discussion of broader consequences of the deal and implications both for the displaced and for the EU going forward. I IntroductionDuring 2015, more than one million refugees and migrants arrived in Europe, about half of whom were fleeing the civil war in Syria and about one third of whom were seeking political asylum. The question of who should bear responsibility for the new arrivals and how those responsibilities should be shared generated very different, sometimes schizophrenic, policy responses among European Union (EU) member states, with many states prioritizing national interests over European solidarity. These divergent national responses generated fierce political debates over legal and normative obligations to the displaced within and across member states. In many capitals, these debates also (re-)kindled national divisions in ways that redounded strikingly to the benefit of right-wing, nationalist political parties.The lack of EU solidarity and absence of a collective response to the humanitarian and political challenges imposed by the influx further laid bare the limitations of common border control and migration and refugee burden-sharing systems that have never been wholly and satisfactorily implemented. 1 By year's end, half a dozen members of the Schengen Zone had unilaterally reinstituted internal border controls under the 'exceptional circumstances' provision of the Article 26 of the Borders Code. 2 Other states, such as Hungary, erected physical barriers to entry along borders with non-Schengen states.