Addressing fake news requires a multidisciplinary effort

The emergence of GNU/Linux as a viable alternative to the Windows operating system and of the Apache webserver software as the leading web server have focused wide attention on the phenomenon of free or open source software. Most of the attention to the economic aspects of the phenomenon has been focused on the question of incentives-why, it is asked, would anyone invest effort in a productive enterprise in whose fruits they do not claim proprietary rights of exclusion-and has been devoted to studying this phenomenon solely in the context of software development. In this paper I expand consideration of the policy implications of the apparent success of free software in two ways. First, I suggest that the phenomenon has broad implications throughout the information, knowledge, and culture economy, well beyond software development. Second, I suggest reasons to think that peer production may outperform market-based production in some information production activities.The first part of the paper expands the observation of the phenomenon of peer production to additional layers of the communications process. In particular, I describe instances of peer production of content, relevance, accreditation, and valueadded distribution as parallels to peer production of software.

loosely affiliated individuals who engage in social practices that involve contributions of the capacity of their private goods in patterns that combine to form large-scale and effective systems for provisioning goods, services, and resources. This Essay seeks to do two things. The first three Parts are dedicated to defining a particular class of physical goods as "shareable goods" that systematically have excess capacity and to combining comparative transaction costs and motivation analysis to suggest that this excess capacity may better be harnessed through sharing relations than through secondary markets. These first three Parts extend the analysis I have performed elsewhere regarding sharing of creative labor, like free software and other peer production,3 to the domain of sharing rival material resources in the production of both rival and nonrival goods and services. The characteristics I use to define shareable goods are sufficient to make social sharing and exchange of material goods feasible as a sustainable social practice. But these characteristics are neither absolutely necessary nor sufficient for sharing to occur. Instead, they define conditions under which, when goods with these characteristics are prevalent in the physicalcapital base of an economy, it becomes feasible for social sharing and exchange to become more salient in the overall mix of relations of production in that economy. The fourth Part is then dedicated to explaining how my observation about shareable goods in the domain of physical goods meshes with the literature on social norms, social capital, and common property regimes, as well as with my own work on peer production. I suggest that social sharing and exchange is an underappreciated modality of economic production, alongside price-based and firm-based market production and state-based production,4 whose salience in the economy is sensitive to technological conditions. The last Part explores how the recognition of shareable goods and sharing as a modality of economic production can inform policy. Shareable goods are goods that are (1) technically "lumpy" and (2) of "mid-grained" granularity. By "lumpy" I mean that they provision then, offers a less freighted name for evaluating mechanisms of social-relations-based economic production. 3. Yochai Benkler, Coase 's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002). 4. In this, my position tracks the tripartite mapping of the universe of organizational forms that resulted from the work on nonprofits in the early 1980s. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of

No abstract

People often favor members of their own group, while discriminating against members of other groups. Such in-group favoritism has been shown to play an important role in human cooperation. However, in the face of changing conflicts and shifting alliances, it is essential for group identities to be flexible. Using the dictator game from behavioral economics, we demonstrate the remodeling of group identities among supporters of Democratic presidential candidates Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. After Clinton's concession in June 2008, Democrats were more generous toward supporters of their own preferred candidate than to supporters of the other Democratic candidate. The bias observed in June persisted into August, and disappeared only in early September after the Democratic National Convention. We also observe a strong gender effect, with bias both appearing and subsiding among men only. This experimental study illustrates a dynamic change in bias, tracking the realignment of real world conflict lines and public efforts to reconstitute group identity. The change in salient group identity we describe here likely contributed to the victory of Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election.dictator game ͉ economic games ͉ evolution of cooperation ͉ Barack Obama ͉ gender differences