To adapt behavior to a changing environment, one must monitor outcomes of executed actions and adjust subsequent actions accordingly. Involvement of the medial frontal cortex in performance monitoring has been suggested, but little is known about neural processes that link performance monitoring to performance adjustment. Here, we recorded from neurons in the medial prefrontal cortex of monkeys learning arbitrary action-outcome contingencies. Some cells preferentially responded to positive visual feedback stimuli and others to negative feedback stimuli. The magnitude of responses to positive feedback stimuli decreased over the course of behavioral adaptation, in correlation with decreases in the amount of prediction error of action values. Therefore, these responses in medial prefrontal cells may signal the direction and amount of error in prediction of values of executed actions to specify the adjustment in subsequent action selections.

Lurasidone [(3aR,4S,7R,7aS)-2-{(1R,2R)-2-[4-(1,2-benzisothiazol-3-yl)piperazin-1-ylmethyl]cyclohexylmethyl}hexahydro-4,7-methano-2H-isoindole-1,3-dione hydrochloride; SM-13496] is an azapirone derivative and a novel antipsychotic candidate. The objective of the current studies was to investigate the in vitro and in vivo pharmacological properties of lurasidone. Receptor binding affinities of lurasidone and several antipsychotic drugs were tested under comparable assay conditions using cloned human receptors or membrane fractions prepared from animal tissue. Lurasidone was found to have potent binding affinity for dopamine D 2 , 5-hydroxytryptamine 2A (5-HT 2A ), 5-HT 7 , 5-HT 1A , and noradrenaline ␣ 2C receptors. Affinity for noradrenaline ␣ 1 , ␣ 2A , and 5-HT 2C receptors was weak, whereas affinity for histamine H 1 and muscarinic acetylcholine receptors was negligible. In vitro functional assays demonstrated that lurasidone acts as an antagonist at D 2 and 5-HT 7 receptors and as a partial agonist at the 5-HT 1A receptor subtype. Lurasidone showed potent effects predictive of antipsychotic activity, such as inhibition of methamphetamine-induced hyperactivity and apomorphine-induced stereotyped behavior in rats, similar to other antipsychotics. Furthermore, lurasidone had only weak extrapyramidal effects in rodent models. In animal models of anxiety disorders and depression, treatment with lurasidone was associated with significant improvement. Lurasidone showed a preferential effect on the frontal cortex (versus striatum) in increasing dopamine turnover. Anti-␣ 1 -noradrenergic, anticholinergic, and central nervous system (CNS) depressant actions of lurasidone were also very weak. These results demonstrate that lurasidone possesses antipsychotic activity and antidepressant-or anxiolytic-like effects with potentially reduced liability for extrapyramidal and CNS depressant side effects.

According to many modern economic theories, actions simply reflect an individual's preferences, whereas a psychological phenomenon called "cognitive dissonance" claims that actions can also create preference. Cognitive dissonance theory states that after making a difficult choice between two equally preferred items, the act of rejecting a favorite item induces an uncomfortable feeling (cognitive dissonance), which in turn motivates individuals to change their preferences to match their prior decision (i.e., reducing preference for rejected items). Recently, however, Chen and Risen [Chen K, Risen J (2010) J Pers Soc Psychol 99:573-594] pointed out a serious methodological problem, which casts a doubt on the very existence of this choice-induced preference change as studied over the past 50 y. Here, using a proper control condition and two measures of preferences (self-report and brain activity), we found that the mere act of making a choice can change self-report preference as well as its neural representation (i.e., striatum activity), thus providing strong evidence for choice-induced preference change. Furthermore, our data indicate that the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex tracked the degree of cognitive dissonance on a trial-by-trial basis. Our findings provide important insights into the neural basis of how actions can alter an individual's preferences.I n Aesop's Fable "The Fox and the Grapes," a fox tries to get some grapes that are hanging on a high, unreachable vine. After failing to reach them, the fox decides that the grapes were probably sour anyway. An interesting aspect of this story is the idea that actions (e.g., giving up on the grapes) can change preferences. Because the dissonance-induced preference change indicates that behaviors can create, not just reflect, people's preferences, it challenges a vital assumption in neoclassical economics that preference or "hedonic utility" determines people's behavior (1).Since Brehm's original study in 1956 (2), this sort of preference change (i.e., the increase in ratings for chosen goods and/or the decrease in ratings for rejected goods) has been repeatedly observed under the "free-choice paradigm" (3-6). In a typical freechoice study design, participants are asked to: (i) rate their preference for a set of goods (e.g., art prints, CDs, and so forth), (ii) choose between two of the goods, and (iii) rate them again. After making a difficult choice between two equally preferred items at stage ii, individuals tend to like the selected item more and the rejected item less than they originally did (2). This tendency happens because when making a choice between two equally highly preferred items, individuals have to give up either of the two liked items. According to cognitive dissonance theory (7), simultaneously holding two or more contradictory cognitions (e.g., "I like the item" and "I rejected it") causes a psychological discomfort called "cognitive dissonance," and individuals are motivated to reduce this discomfort by changing...

Contrary to the widespread belief that people are positively motivated by reward incentives, some studies have shown that performance-based extrinsic reward can actually undermine a person's intrinsic motivation to engage in a task. This "undermining effect" has timely practical implications, given the burgeoning of performance-based incentive systems in contemporary society. It also presents a theoretical challenge for economic and reinforcement learning theories, which tend to assume that monetary incentives monotonically increase motivation. Despite the practical and theoretical importance of this provocative phenomenon, however, little is known about its neural basis. Herein we induced the behavioral undermining effect using a newly developed task, and we tracked its neural correlates using functional MRI. Our results show that performance-based monetary reward indeed undermines intrinsic motivation, as assessed by the number of voluntary engagements in the task. We found that activity in the anterior striatum and the prefrontal areas decreased along with this behavioral undermining effect. These findings suggest that the corticobasal ganglia valuation system underlies the undermining effect through the integration of extrinsic reward value and intrinsic task value.crowding-out effect | dopamine | midbrain | neuroeconomics P erformance-based incentive systems have long been part of the currency of schools and workplaces. This predominance of incentive systems may reflect a widespread cultural belief that performance-based reward is a reliable and effective way to enhance motivation in students and workers. However, classic psychological experiments have repeatedly revealed that performance-based reward can also undermine people's intrinsic motivation (1-6), that is, motivation to voluntarily engage in a task for the inherent pleasure and satisfaction derived from the task itself (3-5). In a typical experiment of this "undermining effect" [also called the "motivation crowding-out effect" (7-9) or "overjustification effect" (2)], participants are randomly divided into a performance-based reward group and a control group, and both groups work on an interesting task. Participants in the performance-based reward group obtain (or expect) reward contingent on their performance, whereas participants in the control group do not. After the session, participants are left to engage in any activity, including more of the target task if they wish, for a brief period when they believe they are no longer being observed (i.e., "free-choice period"). A number of studies (4-6) found that the performance-based reward group spends significantly less time than the control group engaging in the target activity during the free-choice period, providing evidence that the performance-based reward undermines voluntary engagement in the task (i.e., intrinsic motivation for the task).The undermining effect challenges normative economic theories, which assume that raising monetary incentives monotonically increases motivation and, more im...