This paper articulates the potential implications of Brexit on energy policy and security in the United Kingdom (UK). Given the uncertainties associated with the decision to leave the European Union (EU), the need to consider its potential effects on the UK's energy sector becomes even more pertinent. Through the lens of a few widely reviewed trade regimes in the light of Brexit, it can be observed that while UK energy policies are unlikely to change drastically, Brexit nevertheless threatens the UK's capacity to safeguard its energy supply. The uncertainties following Brexit could arguably starve the UK's upstream petroleum, electricity, and renewable energy sectors of their required investments. Both short and long-term impacts could result in UK residents paying more per unit of energy consumed in a "hard Brexit" scenario, where the UK exits the Internal Energy Market (IEM) and must trade with the EU under World Trade Organisation rules. While a hard Brexit could aid the growth of the nascent shale gas industry, a negotiated withdrawal that includes some form of access to the IEM (a "soft Brexit") would be more beneficial for the future of energy security in the UK.

In recent weeks, it appears that regulatory and related policy interest in OPEC and other oil producers rises in direct proportion to the price of oil. On 26–27 June, European Union representatives will be travelling to Siberia in order to seek new regulatory arrangements on oil and gas imports, as well as concessions in relation to Western European investment in the Russian energy sector. Prime Minister Gordon Brown is in Saudi Arabia, seeking regulatory concessions related to higher production levels for oil in order to force prices down. Against this backdrop, he has threatened to spend up to £100 billion (C=127 billion) weaning citizens off the expensive energy imports that threaten family budgets. Similarly, in the recent presidential primaries in the United States, Hillary Clinton promised to bring legal action against OPEC in relation to its cartel status. Notwithstanding the implicit evidence of the weak bargaining power of consumer nations that are forced to visit producer nations for “constructive talks, there is much to commend scholarly attention to the role of regional and multilateral institutions in relation to fossil fuels regulation at this time. This article analyses the role of these institutions (Section 1) particularly in relation to OPEC, against the backdrop of the energy dependency (Section 2) that has evolved among leading oil consumer nations. In Section 3, we scrutinize dual energy pricing, as well as the trade compatibility of one of the EU’s answers to oil dependency, the Renewable Energy Sources Directive. We then proceed to analyse unilateral and multilateral litigation prospects in respect of OPEC’s export regulatory control practices (Section 4) prior to offering some constructive concluding remarks. In view of the current third wave international energy crisis, it is right that multilateralism should serve as a sensible way forward given the abject failure of individual consumer states thus far to both advance a sustainable energy security regulatory and policy framework and, in an integrated fashion, to address the challenges of climate change.

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