This study examines the effect of the readability of firms’ written communication on the behavior of sell-side financial analysts. Using a measure of the readability of corporate 10-K filings, we document that analyst following, the amount of effort incurred to generate their reports, and the informativeness of their reports are greater for firms with less readable 10-Ks. Additionally, we find that less readable 10-Ks are associated with greater dispersion, lower accuracy, and greater overall uncertainty in analyst earnings forecasts. Overall, our results are consistent with the prediction of an increasing demand for analyst services for firms with less readable communication and a greater collective effort by analysts for firms with less readable disclosures. Our results contribute to the understanding of the role of analysts as information intermediaries for investors and the effect of the complexity of written financial communication on the usefulness of this information.

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We analyze data made available through the PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) to provide descriptive evidence on the properties of auditors' actual quantitative materiality judgments and the implications of those judgments for financial reporting. Auditors' quantitative materiality judgments do not appear to result simply from applying conventional rules-of-thumb, (e.g., 5% of pre-tax income), but instead are associated with size-related financial statement outcomes (income, revenues and assets), where the relative importance of the size-related outcomes varies with client characteristics such as financial performance. Using the distribution of actual materiality amounts reported by auditors to the PCAOB as part of the audit-inspection process, we construct a materiality-judgment measure that locates a specific materiality amount within a normal range that is both comparable across varying client characteristics and supported by guidance in audit firm internal policy manuals. We find that looser materiality (an amount closer to the high end of a normal materiality range) is associated with fewer audit hours and lower audit fees, supporting the construct validity of this measure. We also find that looser materiality is associated with lower amounts of proposed audit adjustments and, in extreme cases, with a greater incidence of restatements, highlighting the importance of auditor materiality assessments for financial reporting reliability.

We examine changes in the scope of the sell-side analyst industry and whether these changes impact information dissemination and the quality of analysts' reports. Our findings suggest that changes in the number of analysts covering an industry impact analyst competition and have significant spillover effects on other analysts' forecast accuracy, bias, report informativeness, and effort. These spillover industry effects are incremental to the effects of firm level changes in analyst coverage. Overall, a more significant sell-side analyst industry presence has positive externalities that can result in better functioning capital markets. 1 The growth in the sell-side analyst industry is significantly smaller than that for other finance professionals during this period (Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013)), suggesting that the costs and benefits of sell-side analyst activities likely differ from those of other finance-related activities. Unlike investment bankers or traders, analysts are often a cost center, and attributing how much they contribute to the overall bank activity is difficult even with the best data. Further, the role and contribution of analysts has changed significantly over time. For example, the Global Settlement weakened the connection between analyst activities and investment banking revenue, and trading commissions have declined significantly in recent years. In addition, advances in technology and increased corporate disclosure requirements have lowered the cost of independent financial analysis.

This paper examines how earnings performance relates to firms' narrative R&D disclosure decisions. The unique nature of R&D investments and financial statements' limited ability to communicate the value of such investments highlight the role of narrative disclosure as a supplement to the financial statements. I predict and find that current earnings performance (adjusted for R&D expense) is negatively related to the quantity of narrative R&D disclosure. Conducting a content analysis of the detail, tone, and readability of narrative R&D disclosures, I find that managers adjust R&D disclosures based on earnings performance to provide relevant information rather than to obfuscate performance. Finally, I provide evidence that market participants find narrative R&D disclosure informative because it significantly affects sell-side analyst behavior, disclosure information content, and information asymmetry. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.