When a company establishes subsidiaries with capital provided by a third party, the subsidiaries’ shareholders include the parent company (controlling shareholders) and minority (noncontrolling) shareholders. When shareholders’ interests are divergent, conflicts may arise, causing inefficiencies in the management of the subsidiaries or the corporate group. Such conflicts among shareholders are called principal–principal (PP) conflicts. However, adopting stakeholder-oriented corporate governance, a practice prevalent in Japan, may mitigate such PP conflicts. In fact, many Japanese companies report non-controlling interests in their consolidated financial statements. This paper investigates the influence of PP conflicts in Japanese corporate groups. The availability of nonconsolidated and consolidated financial statements in Japan allows for the comparison of parent companies’ data with those of the corporate group. The results reveal that (1) the larger the minority shareholders ratio (MER), the more the profits shifted to the parent company, and (2) the larger the MER, the higher the growth of the subsidiaries’ sales rates. These results suggest that while the parent company exploits the non-controlling shareholders through profit shifting, it also allocates sales growth opportunities to subsidiaries to mitigate PP conflicts.

This study aimed to investigate the impact of parent companies and other multiple large shareholders (MLSs) on the audit fees in Japanese firms, where stakeholder-oriented corporate governance is adopted. In such a firm, monitoring by many stakeholders can mitigate conflicts among shareholders. However, because the key stakeholders of these firms tend to resolve information asymmetry problems through insider communication, the level of audit effort is affected not only by the audit risk from principal–principal conflicts, but also by the demands of key stakeholders. Japanese parent companies tend to spin off their departments with high growth potential and provide incentives to lower subsidiaries’ cost of capital through information disclosure. Therefore, parent companies require greater audit efforts, and consequently, audit fees are expected to be higher. However, when MLSs are shareholders of the listed subsidiary, they can obtain relevant information via private communication. Thus, the need for quality accounting information will be smaller, the level of audit effort required will be smaller, and as a result, audit fees will be smaller. The results are consistent with these expectations. This paper contributes to the sustainable growth and economic development of firms and markets and has implications for the development of effective corporate governance mechanisms.