Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a powerful nonparametric engineering tool for estimating technical efficiency and production capacity of service units. Assuming an equally proportional change in the output/input ratio, we can estimate how many additional medical resource health service units would be required if the number of hospitalizations was expected to increase during an epidemic outbreak. This assessment proposes a two-step methodology for hospital beds vacancy and reallocation during the COVID-19 pandemic. The framework determines the production capacity of hospitals through data envelopment analysis and incorporates the complexity of needs in two categories for the reallocation of beds throughout the medical specialties. As a result, we have a set of inefficient healthcare units presenting less complex bed slacks to be reduced, that is, to be allocated for patients presenting with more severe conditions. The first results in this work, in collaboration with state and municipal administrations in Brazil, report 3772 beds feasible to be evacuated by 64% of the analyzed health units, of which more than 82% are moderate complexity evacuations. The proposed assessment and methodology can provide a direction for governments and policymakers to develop strategies based on a robust quantitative production capacity measure.

No abstract

No abstract

The counter-effects of imposing penalty clauses in information technology outsourcing agreements.

A misincentive is characterized as an incentive producing the opposite effect of motivating or preventing some specific action. In some circumstances, contract penalties such as sanctions and fines on late delivery or low-quality software encourage the irregularities instead of preventing them from occurring. The present study models misincentive behaviors in Information Technology Outsourcing (ITO) transactions as a Principal-Agent problem. Considering the non-linear relationship in software vendors’ cost structure and the client’s sensitivity to the product/service quality and delivery time, we offer theoretical modeling elucidating the best responses on agreements under incomplete and asymmetric information. Some empirical evidence of contractual misincentives is reported in outsourcing arrangements between private institutions and public administrations in Portugal. The contracts were divided into three categories: pure contracts with no incentive clauses, contracts with no explicit monetary penalties, and contracts under explicit sanctions. The results suggest that the knowledge of the penalty reduces the Agent’s uncertainty about the Principal’s cost structure and might lead them to intentionally delay the delivery of the technology.