In the last few years, Educational Data Mining has become an interesting area exploited to discover and extract hidden knowledge of students from educational environment data. During the establishment of this work an attempt was made to manage the extracted information using mining techniques. These methods took place in order to get groups of students with similar characteristics. The application of classification, clustering and association rules mining algorithms on the data stored on the e-learning (Moodle system) database allowed to extract knowledges that help to understand students' behaviors and patterns. Additionally, the development of a Web application for the educators is a tool to monitor their students learning behavior by monitoring the number of assignments taken, the number of quizzes taken, the number of forum post and read by students, etc. The knowledge obtained can help the instructors to make decision about their students' interacting with the courses activities in Moodle system, and to create an efficient educational environment. In this research, a Data Mining tool called RapidMiner was used for mining the data from the Moodle system database, and a web application written in PHP was established to aid teachers with statistics.

Recently, people became more dependent on online social networks with the increasing use and the rapid development of information technology. Those environments constitute an important area where users interact and create communication ties to maintain their relationships. Furthermore, the time life of these relationships is depending on reputations of the users. Every source (information provider) has a reputation which depends on his frequency of publishing, but also the opinions given by the observers (others users) has an important impact on the determination of this reputation. Since, everyone is trying selfishly to keep a good reputation; a competition is met within these networks. This paper aims to solve this kind of competition through a game theoretic approach; we formulate the said competition as a non-cooperative game, demonstrate the uniqueness of the existent Nash Equilibrium which seems to be the convent solution in this case, then present results clarifying and illustrating the proposed modeling method.

Social Networks have known an important evolution in the last few years. These structures, made up of individuals who are tied by one or more specific types of interdependency, constitute the window for members to express their opinions and thoughts by sending posts to their own walls or others' timelines. Actually, when a content arrives, it's located on the top of the timeline pushing away older messages. This situation causes a permanent competition over visibility among subscribers who jump on opponents to promote conflict. Our study presents this competition as a non-cooperative game; each source has to choose frequencies which assure its visibility. We model it, exploring the theory of concave games, to reach a situation of equilibrium; a situation where no player has the ultimate ability to deviate from its current strategy. We formulate the named game, then we analyze it and prove that there is exactly one Nash equilibrium which is the convergence of all players' best responses. We finally provide some numerical results, taking into consideration a system of two sources with a specific frequency space, and analyze the effect of different parameters on sources' visibility on the walls of social networks.

Over the years, people are becoming more dependent on Online Social Networks, through whom they constitute various sorts of relationships. Furthermore, such areas present spaces of interaction among users; they send more messages and posts showing domains they are interested in to guarantee the level of their popularity. This popularity depends on its own rate, the number of comments the posted topic gets but; also on the cost a user has to pay to accomplish his task on this network. However, the selfish behavior of those subscribers is the root cause of competition over popularity among those users. In this paper, we aim to control the behavior of a social networks users who try their best to increase their popularity in a competitive manner. We formulate this competition as a non-cooperative game. We porpose an efficient game theoretical model to solve this competition and find a situation of equilibrium for the said game.