Research indicates that guided imagery experiences can be mistaken for actual experiences under some circumstances. One explanation for such effects is that memory representations of guided imagery and actual events contain similar phenomenal characteristics such as sensory and contextual details, making the source of the events less distinguishable. This study examined this prediction, comparing memory characteristic ratings for guided imagery experiences with those for memories of perceived and natural imagery events (e.g., fantasies). Results replicated previous findings for the difference between perceived and natural imagery memories. Guided imagery ratings were also lower than those for perceived memories for most sensory details (sound, smell, and taste) and temporal details. However, guided imagery ratings for reflective details were lower than both perceived and natural imagery memory ratings. Thus, guided imagery was similar to natural imagery with respect to sensory details, but similar to perceived memories with respect to reflective details.

Concern has recently been raised about the potential for guided images to be mistaken for memories of actual events. According to the reality-monitoring framework, such misattributions can occur due to the similarity of sensory and reflective memory characteristics acquired at encoding, or due to source judgement processes at retrieval. A study was conducted to examine the similarity of guided images and perceived memories at imagery encoding, and after a short delay. Participants rated the characteristics of an actual event, a natural imagery event (e.g. a fantasy), and a guided imagery experience, immediately and after a one-week interval. For each condition, participants discussed their memory or guided imagery experience with the researcher as they reviewed or created it. Ratings indicated that guided imagery was similar to perceived memory with respect to sensory characteristics. However, the factors associated with supporting memories (contextual and temporal detail, setting familiarity, and recollection of surrounding events) were less vivid for guided imagery than for perceived events. In all cases, these patterns were stable over time.

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Memory judgement processes, based on the characteristics and associations of retrieved memories such as sensory details and supporting memories, are considered as important as retrieval in several autobiographical memory models. Judgement processes have received less research attention than memory characteristics themselves. The present studies examined memory judgement using qualitative analysis of the reasons participants gave for confidence in retrieved childhood memories. For memories they were confident of, participants cited memory phenomenology, especially sensory and affective details, much more frequently than consistency with other autobiographical knowledge. For memories they were not confident of, participants reported lack of consistency with autobiographical knowledge or with others' memories more often than memory phenomenology as reasons for their uncertainty. Participants' comments also revealed several metacognitive beliefs about the relationship between memory characteristics and accuracy. These data are consistent with two-process models of memory judgement associated with true versus false memories.