Judgement of confidence in childhood memories

Abstract

Memory judgement processes, based on the characteristics and associations of retrieved memories such as sensory details and supporting memories, are considered as important as retrieval in several autobiographical memory models. Judgement processes have received less research attention than memory characteristics themselves. The present studies examined memory judgement using qualitative analysis of the reasons participants gave for confidence in retrieved childhood memories. For memories they were confident of, participants cited memory phenomenology, especially sensory and affective details, much more frequently than consistency with other autobiographical knowledge. For memories they were not confident of, participants reported lack of consistency with autobiographical knowledge or with others' memories more often than memory phenomenology as reasons for their uncertainty. Participants' comments also revealed several metacognitive beliefs about the relationship between memory characteristics and accuracy. These data are consistent with two-process models of memory judgement associated with true versus false memories.

Reasons for withdrawing belief in vivid autobiographical memories

“…For example, people sometimes "fill in the blanks" in memories for alcoholinduced blackouts by relying on other people who were also drinking to reconstruct (or fabricate) what occurred (Nash & Takarangi, 2011). When individuals report reduced confidence in the accuracy of memories, they most frequently cite lack of social verification as the reason for their uncertainty (Arbuthnott et al, 2008). Wade et al (2014) reported that individuals consider social verification to be a reliable and low-cost method relative to other memory verification strategies.…”

“…Previous studies have documented memory verification strategies when personal memories are held with uncertainty. This might happen when the memory does not feel coherent, or the memory might conflict with other autobiographical knowledge such as the recollections of others who witnessed the event (Arbuthnott, Kealy, & Ylioja, 2008). When subjects recalled childhood memories of questionable accuracy and then described how they would verify the memories, the two most frequently endorsed strategies involved seeking information from family members or cognitive approaches such as trying to recall further details (Kemp & Burt, 2006;Wade & Garry, 2005).…”

Explicit and implicit confidence judgments and developmental differences in metamemory: an eye-tracking approach

“…For example, the degree of detailedness of a memory content (Arbuthnott et al 2008), the experienced memory vividness (Robinson et al 2000), cue familiarity and target retrievability (Metcalfe and Finn 2008), issues of consensuality (Koriat 2008), and trace accessibility (Koriat 1993(Koriat , 1995 have been discussed to influence monitoring judgments via the involved memory retrieval processes. In children, however, only very few studies focusing on performance predictions have documented an influence of item difficulty and thus strength of underlying memory representation on monitoring (Koriat et al 2009;Koriat and Shitzer-Reichert 2002;Lockl and Schneider 2003).…”

A robust preference for cheap-and-easy strategies over reliable strategies when verifying personal memories

“…For example, most subjects in one study said that if one of their childhood memories were challenged, they would verify that memory by consulting friends or family, or by mentally trawling for confirmatory or disconfirmatory recollections (Wade & Garry, 2005; see also Arbuthnott, Kealy, & Ylioja, 2008;Kemp & Burt, 2006;Wade, Nash, & Garry, 2014). But how do people decide which of these strategies to use?…”