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Marine autonomy research has focused on algorithmic and technical developments, targeting autonomous craft in restricted areas where international rules and regulations are not prioritised. This paper addresses the system engineering aspect of a highly complex system in which the seamless, predictable, and secure interoperability of vendorspecific hardware and software subsystems is a fundamental requirement for designing and implementing cyber-physical systems with artificial intelligence to assist or replace the navigating officer, such as autonomous marine surface vehicles. It addresses international rules in the sector and exhibits a system architecture that can fulfil the criteria for safe behaviour in foreseen occurrences and the capacity to request human aid if the autonomous system cannot manage a problem. The system thinking and engineering provided in this article have been applied to The GreenHopper, a harbour bus currently under construction and intended to undergo certification and enter commercial service.

Autonomous systems strive to obtain salient features that include computer intelligence for obtaining situation awareness, decision support to a human navigator, or for facilitating autonomous decision-making in unmanned vehicles. This paper considers the case of autonomous marine surface vehicles, where high-quality decision support will be instrumental for obtaining a periodically unattended bridge and for approval of unmanned bridge operation with fallback through remote operation. The proposed design focuses on a sovereign-based architecture that facilitates safety, resilience and cyber-security. We address central elements of risk in the development and approval of autonomous systems; we analyze the challenges associated with testing, commissioning and maintenance of a highly complex cyber-physical system, and describe design principles for the sovereign agents architecture.

Autonomous marine surface vehicles rely on computer systems with computer intelligence making decisions to assist or replace the navigating officer. A fundamental requirement for the design and implementation of such a cyber-physical system is seamless, predictable, and secure interoperability between vendor-specific hardware and software subsystems. The article describes a system design that includes mechanisms to mitigate the risks and consequences of software defects, individual component malfunction, and harmful cyber interference. It addresses international regulations in the field and demonstrates a system design that can meet the requirements for safe behaviour in foreseeable events while also having the ability to call for human assistance if the autonomous system is unable to handle a situation. The paper presents a design for highly automated vessels with several inherent risk-reducing features, including the ability to isolate and encapsulate abnormal behaviours, built-in features to support resilience to unexpected events, and mechanisms for internal defence against cyber-attacks. The article shows how this is provided by a novel middleware that supports risk mitigation, dependability, and resilience.