A number of studies have estimated how much energy conservation is achieved by providing households with real-time information on energy use via in-home displays. However, none of these studies tell us why real-time information changes energy-use behavior. We explore the causal mechanisms through which real-time information affects energy consumption by conducting a randomized-control trial with residential households. The experiment disentangles two competing mechanisms: (i) learning about the energy consumption of various activities, the "learning effect", versus (ii) having a constant reminder of energy use, the "saliency effect". We have two main results. First, we find a statistically significant treatment effect from receiving real-time information. Second, we find that learning plays a more prominent role than saliency in driving energy conservation. This finding supports the use of energy conservation programs that target consumer knowledge regarding energy use.

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Social norms for cooperation are often supported by positive and negative sanctions. Simultaneously, positive interactions in human relationships via sanctions are promoted by positive social behavior. this study investigates the relationship between social behavior and sanctions based on economic laboratory experiments. participants with unique iDs make decisions on the contribution to public goods, which is inefficient for society. After participating in the public goods game, they decide whether to use the sanctions. the type of sanctions are varied, such as no sanction, only punishable, only rewardable, and all of these are possible. We found that inefficient social behavior increases under conditions where participants can reward each other and that the level of social activity and rewards are positively correlated. To exclude the possibility of the participants misunderstanding inefficiency, we performed an additional experiment that emphasizes the meaning of inefficiency that the contribution toward public goods reduces profits in society as a whole. We found that even with this emphasis, the high level of contributions is sustained when sanctions are possible. A group-level comparison showed that the group that maintained bad norms used the reward option more. our results suggest that people maintain bad norms in anticipation of positive interaction. Some social norms have positive outcomes in society while others have negative outcomes. A typical example of a good social norm is cooperation in situations with a social dilemma such as the preservation of natural resources 1 and provision of public goods 2. A cooperative norm deters free-riders and results in better outcomes by indicating a cooperative action as normative behavior. In contrast, some social norms have negative outcomes on welfare. For example, gift giving around the holiday seasons is an event in which people are expected to participate. Although such a custom is considered inefficient by economists 3 , why is this "bad" social norm still prevalent? Some explanations of bad social norms have been proposed by researchers of economics, sociology, and social psychology both theoretically 4,5 and experimentally 6-8 , but none have captured the interaction between social norms and social capital. Some researchers view social capital as a mechanism that enhances expected returns of individuals through investment in social relations 9. If following a bad norm is considered as investment in social capital, returns in the subsequent social interaction are observed. For example, trust in a society is a form of social capital that enables successful social exchange that improves social welfare 10,11. Meanwhile, some theorists argue that such norms play a role in developing identity and solidarity in a group 12. focused on social norms on dress codes and pointed out that members of a social group can "declare one's group identity to other members and to nonmembers" 13 proposed that people make gains and losses in accordance and discordance with social ...

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