Nudges, one of the rapidly growing law-making and public policy tools, are considered by their proponents to have a generally neutral effect on autonomy. Our study is the first to test nudges under the prism of Self-Determination Theory, a motivational theory which posits that autonomy is a basic psychological need. We focus on a specific type of nudge, defaults, and test it within the context of making a choice among a hypothetical set of insurance programs for post-graduate students.Results show that the experience of an Internal Perceived Locus of Causality (I-PLOC) is negatively affected by defaults when the number of options is low but there is no effect when it is high. In other words, people are less likely to view themselves as the origin of their choices when defaults are in place and when options are manageable. The experience of an I-PLOC has a positive effect on self-regulation and vitality, partially mediated by perceived competence. We suggest that since even mild manipulations show an undermining effect on autonomy, the so-called 'libertarian paternalistic' interventions should be evaluated on the basis of their effect on basic need satisfaction, self-regulation and vitality, all of which are associated with autonomy according to Self-Determination Theory.

If acting morally can be viewed as acting consistently with a moral principle or rule, then being a person with moral integrity can be viewed as consistently applying moral principles or rules across different types of situations. We advance a view of moral integrity that incorporates three distinct, but interrelated, types of moral consistency: cognitive, emotional and motivational moral consistency. Our approach is based on Self-Determination Theory, a motivational theory that can explain when a moral rule becomes the primary motive for behavior. We argue that moral integrity is achieved when a person acts on the basis of an internal moral system of principles, emotions and motives and provide an account of the way that it develops during a person's interaction with the environment.

Paternalism is the restriction of a person's autonomy for the good of that person. It embodies a familiar conflict of intuitions: while we cherish individual freedom, we also want to protect/promote what we know to be good. So, every paternalist must meet two challenges: paternalism must be justifiable as a restriction of autonomy as well as effective in terms of well-being. In this essay, I argue that the 'autonomy' restricted by paternalism is a Razian brand of free self-authorship and that the 'good' protected is captured by Martha Nussbaum's account of personal wellbeing. I then defend a mild welfare paternalism based on a dichotomy implicit in any defensible description of well-being. I argue that some aspects of the good life do not require endorsement and, therefore, can be justifiably and effectively promoted by autonomy-restricting means. Finally, I discuss why paternalism need not be hostile to ethical independence.

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