This paper analyses the extent to which Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy orientation stems from ideas and identity rather than from materialist and systemic factors alone. Finding such narrow approaches insufficient for explaining small state behavior, and drawing on liberal and constructivist approaches to international relations theory, the article argues that Georgia's foreign policy orientation has a strong basis in the widespread ideological perception amongst the local political elite that Georgia "belongs" in the West. Based on this theoretical framework, this paper provides a historical overview of Georgia's foreign policy, tracing the evolution of Georgia's identity from seeing itself as "Christian" in contrast to its Islamic neighbors, to identifying as European in contrast to a modern, Russian "other". As Georgia attempts to construct a collective international identity, the devotion to the idea of Euro-Atlantic integration as a "sacred destiny" amongst the country's elite has significant foreign policy implications. This article overviews the current challenges and dilemmas of self-identification and investigates the roles that national identity and the prevailing "European" identity play in Georgia's quest for "desovietization".

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea and South Caucasus has become the focus of considerable international attention, primary because it is one of the oldest and potentially richest oil and gas producing areas in the world. The August 2008 Russian invasion of the Georgia and the unilateral recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia fundamentally changed the situation in the region. The war has created a new strategic situation. And the question is now how to handle this delicate situation in a strategically and geopolitically important region. So by controlling Georgia (in case Russia reaches abovementioned aims), Russia actually will be able to cut off Central Asia and Caspian resources. It means Russia would be able to isolate and cut off Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries and it will significantly strengthen its energy monopoly over Europe with all results coming out from that fact. So it's about major shift in the energy policy and major shift in geopolitics based on this energy policy and Russian energy monopoly. The August war in Georgia demonstrated some risks associated with the functioning of the transit energy corridor in the southern Caucasus. It also demonstrated the need for broader security guarantees for a region that is vital to European and global energy security. Paper deals with economic damage inflicted by the Russo-Georgian war in South Caucasus and its implications for regional security.

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This article assesses the European Union's (EU) performance in promoting societal resilience in the Eastern Partnership countries (EaP) on examples of Georgia and Ukraine. We examine two approaches to external resilience-building employed by the EU: support for the sources of societal resilience (social trust, legitimacy of governance actors, design of governance institutions) and prevention of domestic and external risks. Our research shows that while Ukraine and Georgia possess a moderate degree of societal resilience both countries also suffer from a high exposure to domestic and external risks, making them dependent on external resilience-building support from the EU. Analysis of the EU's resilience-building agenda in Georgia and Ukraine shows a mixed record for the EU. While the EU managed to strengthen sources of resilience and alleviate domestic risks in both countries, it failed to mitigate geopolitical risks: leaving the window open for new conflicts and endangering the sustainability of its resilience agenda.

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