This paper discusses the shift in the representation of the family through a case study of Lost City (2012-2013). The programme challenges the dominant representations of the family on Turkish television that are mostly framed by a particular neighbourhood culture and are characterized by organic solidarity. As outsiders in Turkish society, a prostitute, a Kurdish family, and a Black illegal immigrant challenge the unity of the Toptas family that has moved to Istanbul from the Black Sea region of Turkey and who are trying hard to survive against poverty and the 'cosmopolitan culture' of the city. The series problematizes the borders of the family as different members of the Toptas family develop new relationships extending the family to include the outsiders of Turkish society. Drawing on Turkish family dramas such as

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Turkish television has seen the diversification of themes and genres in both fictional and factual programmes reflecting the expansion of the television market in the 2000s. As well as thematic television channels, various television shows on cooking and food are currently on air in Turkey. These cookery programmes not only introduce and ‘re-invent’ local recipes from different regions of Turkey but also promote particular lifestyles and consumption patterns for the audience. However, in the case of Turkey, cookery programmes draw comparisons between Islamic and secular lifestyles through combining religious tales with personal stories, local ingredients with global recipes and suggested housework strategies for producing tasteful food. This article examines Kitchen Love, a cookery programme presented by Emine Beder, one of the pioneers of culinary consumption as a form of popular culture. Both Emine Beder’s public persona and her show frame food and cooking as part of an Islamic identity that negotiates Islamic values in relation to modern lifestyles and patterns of consumption.

The attempted coup in Turkey in July 2016 provided a justification for the Turkish government to silence oppositional voices in the media and close down many television stations. Though the stated aim was to clamp down on the pro-coup Gulenist movement, the closure of TV channels has resulted in what I call a 'communicative ethnocide' silencing Alevi television in particular. Following Yalcinkaya, who builds on Clastres concept of ethnocide, I define 'communicative ethnocide' as the annihilation of the communicative capacity of a particular community by the state with the aim of destroying that community's cultural identity. Although the closure of TV stations was not confined to Alevi channels, it has particular implications for the Alevi community by destroying its communicative capacity, infrastructure, relations with the viewers, and representation regime which are driven by the community's political ambitions and attempts to sustain transnational connections. Parallels are drawn between Alevi and Kurdish TV to illustrate the Turkish context.

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