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This study investigates differences in firms’ tax avoidances between multinational and national. Furthermore, it investigates the differences between firms’ contingent behavior because of the country’s investor protection level and law systems. This research takes into account the firms’ tax avoidance phenomenon. Besides that, it proposes novelties as follows. First, this study highlights that multinational firms tend to avoid taxes higher than national ones. Second, it induces the dividend catering theory related to the country’s investor protection. The latest, it persuades that country’s investor protection, and law systems make firms contingent on their tax avoidance behaviors. This study finds that firms where they live in high investors’ protection countries and common law did higher tax avoidance than others. The findings imply that these firms could grow higher than others. It means that this study suggests economic consequences. The consequence is that a country should increase its investors’ protection level and somehow redefine its law systems. Therefore, it could enhance its capital market and subsequently improve the national welfares.

This study investigates the determinants of fraudulent financial reporting in Indonesia and the responsibility of auditor for fraudulent financial reporting. This study posits that fraud triangle affects the fraudulent financial reporting, and auditors do not give unqualified opinion for fraud firms. The sample consists of 380 firms listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. The 39 of 380 firms have received punishment from BAPEPAM during 2007-2010 periods. This study uses logistic regression to test the first hypothesis and correlation to test the second hypothesis. The finding suggests that: 1) fraud triangle (opportunity, pressure, and rationalization) does not affect the fraudulent financial reporting; 2) auditor opinion has a positive correlation towards fraudulent financial reporting.

The issue of managerial overconfidence in managers has been studied in relation to audit pricing. Previous studies examined the relationship between managerial overconfidence and audit fees from the supply side. This study investigates the association of managerial overconfidence and audit fees from the demand side. We found a significant negative relationship between managerial overconfidence and audit fees. This finding supports the demand side perspective of audit pricing, specifically that overconfident management demands low quality audit services and subsequently low audit fees. In addition, we also investigated the role of the audit committee in the relationship between managerial overconfidence and audit fees, and found that a negative and significant relationship between managerial overconfidence and audit fees only occurred in companies with a strong audit committee. These findings suggest that a strong audit committee is able to offset the negative effect of managerial overconfidence by increasing monitoring of the financial reporting process, and auditors responds to this by reducing the level of risk of financial reporting and subsequently the audit fee. Contribution/Originality: This study contributes to the auditing field by providing empirical evidence on the impact of CEO characteristics (overconfidence) on audit fees from the demand side perspective. Other studies have examined the factors affecting audit fees from the supply-side perspective. 1. INTRODUCTION Previous research in audit pricing isolates management characteristics as a determinant of audit fees. Carcello, Hermanson, and Ye (2011) suggest the need to incorporate management into the analysis due to management's significant influence on accounting, auditing, and internal control. In line with this suggestion, recent research on the determinants of audit fees on the client side began to incorporate management attributes into their considerations, such as those of the chief executive officer (CEO) demographic characteristics (

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