Venture capitalists provide money and non-monetary contributions to high-growth ventures to help them become great companies. Although it is known that these contributions have an impact on the growth of the firm, little is known in Mexico of their nature, how they get into the venture, and how they contribute to the development of the company. The present article reports a proposed substantive theory that explains how the venture capitalist work hand in hand with the entrepreneur to grow the company. This substantive theory emerged from data collected through interviews to nine venture capitalists and nine entrepreneurs, and analyzed as proposed by the grounded theory methodology. The resulting substantive theory acknowledges that contributions of venture capitalists, often called value-added, are relative to building an exit for the investment.

We explore the relationship between status and reputation, examining how its dynamics change over time as these two intangible assets coevolve and how reputation and status are influenced by participation in highly visible events. Using a sample of more than 400 newly founded venture capital (VC) firms, we find that reputation and status positively influence each other but that reputation has a greater effect on status, particularly when firms are older. We also find that the effect of past status on current status weakens as VC firms age, but the relationship between past and current reputation remains consistent with age. Furthermore, our findings show that participating in big hitsblockbuster initial public offerings-has a positive relationship with status when firms are young and a positive relationship with reputation when firms are older, and it helps low-status and low-reputation firms more than it helps highstatus and high-reputation firms. This study helps differentiate status and reputation, shows how they coevolve, and provides insight into how new firms build these important intangible assets.

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Firms not only combine resources within firm boundaries but tap into, acquire, or consolidate resources outside firm boundaries. Alliances and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are distinct vehicles for governing inter-firm resource combinations. Prior studies on the governance choice between them have relied on firm- or dyad-level attributes to explicate the choice firms make about the governance. However, any firm or dyad is a micro-structure embedded in networks that shape the flow of information and resources to the focal firm or dyad. In addition, although alliances and mergers and acquisitions involve either horizontal or vertical resource combinations, the vertical dimension of resource relatedness has been largely neglected in prior research. This study examines the impact of structural embeddedness and vertical resource relatedness on governance choice. We find that structural embeddedness is an important driver of governance choice and that a significant portion of resource combinations occurs along the vertical dimension of relatedness.

Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue This study examines how separation of cash flow and voting rights influences performance of firms affiliated with large family business groups. Complementing the dominant view grounded in agency theory, we suggest that the separation of cash flow and voting rights has positive influence on firm performance in the context of large family business groups. Research Findings/Insights Using the data from the large family business groups in Korea, or Chaebols, between 2003 and 2010, we found that the separation is positively associated with firm accounting performance, but not with market performance. We also found that the effect of the separation is moderated by analyst coverage, R&D expenditure, and sales share in the business group. Theoretical/Academic Implications This study reveals that in the large family business groups, the context in which the separation most frequently occurs, the separation not only induces the controlling minority shareholders to pursue private benefits of control but also accompanies financing benefits from active use of the internal capital market. In addition, this study notes the importance of addressing the endogeneity in the analysis of the relation between ownership structure and performance. Practitioner/Policy Implications This study offers insights to policy makers planning to enforce/revoke the regulation on the separation of cash flow and voting rights in the pursuit of corporate governance reform especially in countries with poor shareholder protection.