Since the 1970s, centralized interventions into the infrastructural affairs of US cities have been in decline. As a result, local entities have been compelled to shoulder a greater share of the burden for developing the urban infrastructure networks and public works needed to support growth. Under conditions of neoliberalism, local officials and growth-machine participants have pursued this local infrastructural imperative by means of increasingly speculative and risky financing strategies deployed through the 'back door' of traditional democratic channels. The following analysis is empirically focused on three Californian cities -Emeryville, Oxnard and Vallejo -which achieved impressive levels of growth around the turn of the twenty-first century. However, these cities subsequently suffered precipitous economic contraction. As such, they demonstrate the unprecedented challenges now facing the urban growth machine in the wake of the current global economic crisis. Two emergent challenges, in particular, appear poised to challenge the historical resiliency of the growth machine: the 'reverse infrastructural trap' and nascent conflicts between municipal bondholders and municipal employees. The cases presented here thus raise important questions about the continued viability of the pro-growth agenda in the context of structural fiscal deficits, chronic infrastructural decline and extreme capital-market volatility.

Two Community Development Corporations (CDCs) in Oakland, California, anchor the following analysis. These legally homogenous organizations have implemented similar “low-income” redevelopment projects widely hailed as representing a single successful blueprint for urban revitalization. Despite their similarities, however, these entities have produced starkly different socio-economic outcomes—a phenomenon traced to the CDCs' divergent internal structures and the contrasting external contexts of their development activities. These variations generated competing “logics” of redevelopment. On one hand, we find a CDC dominated by market-oriented interests and the economic logic of exchange-values, while on the other, we find a CDC dominated by community-oriented interests and the social logic of neighborhood use-values.

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Detroit’s long-range planning agenda—as articulated in the Detroit Future City (DFC) plan—is based on an innovative vision of a smaller, greener city. Implementing this vision rests on clearing the city’s most abandoned and deteriorated neighborhoods and transforming the area into vast green spaces. Eventually, therefore, the eighty-eight thousand people currently residing in this zone must (be) relocate(d). As services are phased out and infrastructure networks decommissioned, it is reasoned outmigration will accelerate; this strategy of “urban triage” geographically targets expenditures on the basis of viability, such that the flow of public resources to “nonviable” neighborhoods is constricted. This article explores one assumption that underlies triage-based policy and planning. Namely, it is believed that by removing infrastructures and services (“city systems”) from a given area, people will leave that area, a causal proposition that can be broken into two constituent parts. First, there is nothing unproblematic about removing, no matter how incrementally, the city systems that serve as the skeletal framework of the city. City systems are politically and institutionally embedded within a complex web of intersecting structures, processes, relationships, and interests—a “stickiness” that complicates efforts to dismantle them. The second half of the proposition is that removing city systems will provide the needed incentive for people to voluntarily move out of the targeted areas. This assumption, however, may not appreciate the degree of socio-spatial persistence that can be exhibited by groups occupying abandoned spaces. Thus, even if efforts to geographically shrink city systems are successful, there is reason to believe that social remnants of community may indefinitely persist in target areas even in the face of great hardship—including the cessation of basic services. The present analysis suggests that the burden of proof falls on those predicting that the withdrawal of city systems will succeed where decades of generalized deprivation have failed.

Numerous U.S. cities suffered immense fiscal strain following the subprime mortgage crisis and financial crash of 2007–8. Diminished revenues, tightened credit, and speculative financing that went bad in the aftermath fueled widespread fiscal distress on the local scale. Although the current moment resembles fiscal crises that crested in cities in the 1970s–90s, two factors distinguish the current period. First, municipal affairs have become thoroughly financialized—dominated by speculative securities and volatile debt arrangements—such that local crisis can no longer be understood apart from financial market instability. Second, local fiscal politics have become increasingly removed from democratic oversight and control. This de-democratization hinders the capacity of political communities to reregulate markets and rebuild urban communities. An analytic model derived from the work of Hyman Minsky and Karl Polanyi emphasizes how cities become ensnared in a “financial instability” cycle and how communities seek to protect themselves by way of the “double movement.”