This book presents a model for examining problems of institutional change and applies it to American economic development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The authors develop their model of institutional change. They argue that if external economic factors make an increase in income possible but not attainable within the existing institutional structure, new organizations must be developed to achieve the potential in income. Their model is designed to explain the type and timing of these necessary changes in institutional organization. Individual, voluntary cooperative, and governmental arrangements are included in the discussion, although the latter differs considerably from the first two.

This paper attempts to provide an explanation of the formation and mutation of economic institutions. It is specifically concerned with that process as it has developed over the past one hundred and seventy-five years of American history, but with appropriate changes the model might be used to predict institutional change in the future and to explain institutional change in other nations and in other eras. Like more traditional theory, the model has been formulated in a manner that makes it in principle operational, although we admit that it predicts relatively little. Profit maximization is the motivating force, and in this sense too the model fits into the stream of neo-classical economics, although like the macro models of Keynes its subject has not traditionally been considered a part of that discipline. Finally, we admit that the theory is at some points woefully weak and the explanations at times incredibly simplistic. The work, however, does, we feel, represent a first step towards a useful theory of institutional change.

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It is necessary not only that capital be accumulated, but also that it be mobilized for productive use, if an economy is to benefit from an increase in capital per person. The classical model of resource allocation assumes that within any economy capital is perfectly mobile. It implies, therefore, that once allowance is made for uncertainty and risk, returns on investment are equal in all industries in all regions. Such a model, while logically consistent, is not very useful for analyzing the process of economic growth. In the early stages of development, because the uncertainty discounts are high, capital is not very mobile. As a result, rates of return vary widely between industries and between regions; and growth in high-interest regions is retarded. Development, in part then, takes the form of a reduction in uncertainty discounts—a reduction that makes it possible for capital to move more freely between regions and industries.

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