This article introduces evolutionary psychology to a general readership, with the purpose of applying evolutionary psychology to suicide terrorism. Some of the key concepts related to evolutionary psychology are discussed, as well as several misconceptions associated with this approach to psychology. We argue that one of the primary, but insufficient, motivating factors for suicide terrorism is strong religious belief. Evolutionary psychological theories related to religious belief, and supporting empirical work, are described, laying a foundation for examining suicide terrorism. Several promising directions for future research on suicide terrorism from an evolutionary psychological perspective are highlighted, particularly within the theoretical framework of kin selection, and the implications of applying evolutionary psychology to suicide terrorism are discussed.

People make inferences about others depending on the way they arrive at their moral decisions. Here, we examine evaluations of people who make moral decisions through deliberation compared to those who decide based on empathy. To do so, we turn to charitable donations. People often fail to prioritize the cost-effectiveness of charities when donating . We argue that this pattern exists in part because donors who make charitable decisions by deliberating about the cost-effectiveness of charities are perceived as less moral and less desirable as social partners than those who decide based on empathizing with the recipients of the donation. Across six pre-registered studies using two different scenarios (N = 1,961), we presented participants with descriptions of people who thought about donation decisions by either deliberating about the costeffectiveness of charities, or by deciding based on empathy. Reliably, participants judged "deliberators" to have less positive moral character and to be less desirable as social partners than "empathizers." We found these results across different designs (between-subjects and within-subjects), when evaluating respondents of different genders (male and female), and for donations of different stakes (low and high). The negative reputational effects of deliberating were reduced if "deliberators" expressed empathy first. These results suggest that there may be disincentives for selecting charities based on their impact, since people are not socially rewarded for prioritizing charitable impact but are rewarded for signaling the right kinds of moral traits. We end by discussing implications and limitations of these findings.

Recent research on the metaethical beliefs of ordinary people appears to show that they are metaethical pluralists that adopt different metaethical standards for different moral judgments. Yet the methods used to evaluate folk metaethical belief rely on the assumption that participants interpret what they are asked in metaethical terms. We argue that most participants do not interpret questions designed to elicit metaethical beliefs in metaethical terms, or at least not in the way researchers intend. As a result, existing methods are not reliable measures of metaethical belief. We end by discussing the implications of our account for the philosophical and practical implications of research on the psychology of metaethics.

No abstract

No abstract