The introduction to the special issue provides a framework to think about the changing conceptions of Sayyid-ness in various historical contexts in South Asia. First, we review some of the sociological and anthropological literature on caste among South Asian Muslims, to argue for a contextualised and historicised study of Muslim social stratification in Muslims’ own terms. Second, we throw light on the fact that Sayyid-ness, far from being a transhistorical fact, may be conceptualised differently in different socio-political and historical contexts. For instance, Sayyid pedigree was at times downplayed in favour of a more encompassing Ashraf identity in order to project the idea of a single Muslim community. Far from projecting an essentialising image of Sayyid-ness, by focusing on historical change, the articles in this collection de-naturalise Sayyids’ and Ashraf's social superiority as a ‘well-understood and accepted fact’. They further shift attention from the debate on ‘Muslim caste’, often marred by Hindu-centric assumptions, to focus instead on social dynamics among South Asian Muslims ‘in their own terms’. In so doing, these studies highlight the importance of the local, while pointing to possible comparisons with Muslim groups outside South Asia.

This article explores the role of Jamia Millia Islamia—the National Muslim University—in the formation of a composite national identity in India around the time of partition. This institution, born under the dual influence of the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movements, constituted for its members a ‘laboratory’ for the nation. Through their educational experiments and constructive workà laGandhi, Jamia teachers and students sought to lay the ground for an independence that would be ‘meaningful’ not only for Muslims but for the entire nation. In so doing, Jamia members claimed the right for Muslims to be recognized as ‘unhyphenated Indians’, able to speak for the nation. This article thus discusses the efforts of Jamia members to promote an inclusive conception of ‘composite India’ of which Muslims were fully part. At the same time, it highlights the ambiguous attitude of government authorities vis-à-vis the institution. Despite Jamia members’ strong affinities with Congress leaders, notably Nehru, the school received little support from state authorities after independence. Paradoxically, Nehru's government preferred to turn towards another Muslim institution—Aligarh Muslim University—often considered the ‘cradle’ of ‘Muslim separatism’, in order to reach out to Muslim citizens and promote national integration. By exploring the motivations behind this paradoxical choice as well as the complex relations between Jamia and Nehru's government, this article highlights some of Nehru's own ambiguities towards the ‘Gandhian’ legacy as well as to Muslim representation in secular India.

Away from Aligarh's bustling old city, across the railway track which divides the city into "two adjacent towns" (Mann 1992:28), lies the sprawling campus of Aligarh Muslim University (AMU). Bab-e-Syed, a grand gate made of sandstone and marble, acts as the visible frontier between the outside world and the venerable institution. Inside, the sherwanis that some students wear and the cusped arches and domes of older buildings give the campus a distinct mahaul (atmosphere) that further marks it out from the rest of the city.Although AMU occupies a separate, somehow peripheral space in Aligarh city, it remains for many a central symbol of Muslims' tahzeeb (culture) and socio-political status in India. From the very outset, Aligarh's founders projected their college-then known as the Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental College-as an all-India Muslim institution. Sir Syed 1 and his colleagues claimed to serve the interests of all Indian Muslims, even though in practice they mostly addressed North Indian ashraf 2 elites. After independence, many Aligarhians continued to see their alma mater as a source of pride for the community. To them, it epitomized Sir Syed's efforts to uplift Muslims and to preserve the legacy of the glorious Mughal past. By contrast, many outsiders regarded the institution with suspicion. Due to students and teachers' widespread support to Muslim League in the 1940s, AMU became a lieu de mémoire (memorial site) of partition and a symbol of so-called Muslim separatism (Brass 200. In either case, AMU was more than an educational institution. To its supporters and detractors alike, it appeared as a symbol of Muslims' position in India before and after independence. AMU therefore occupies a very special position in the Indian public sphere. It is simultaneously a central university, under control of the central government, and the Crisis of the "Nehruvian Consensus" or Pluralization of Indian Politics? Alig...

Who speaks for Muslims in India? Who are the leaders of the so-called “Muslim organizations”? What family and educational background do they come from? What is their relation to state authorities? This article addresses these questions by presenting a unique biographical database and the results of statistical treatments (multiple correspondence analysis and hierarchical clustering on principal components) of this data. This database includes the office-bearers of a selected set of organizations that make representative claims in the name of Muslims in India. Our analysis thus delineates the contours of the social space of Muslim spokespersons in India and describes how it is structured. We will highlight the important distinctions that exist among these Muslim spokespersons, such as the opposition between secular figures and religious scholars, the political sphere and the educational sphere, and between central power and regional dynamics. This analysis allows us, more broadly, to examine the role of state authorities in the definition of the Muslim spokespersons, thus highlighting some of the characteristic features of state secularism in India.

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