The notion that dreaming might alter the strength of associative links in memory was first proposed almost 200 years ago. But no strong evidence of such altered associative links has been obtained. Semantic priming can be used to quantify the strength of associative links between pairs of words; it is thought to measure the automatic spread of activation from a "node" representing one word to nodes representing semantically related words. Semantic priming could thus be used to test for global alterations in the strengths of associative links across the wake-sleep cycle. Awakenings from REM and nonREM (NREM) sleep produce a period of state carry-over during which performance is altered as a result of the brain's slow transition to full wakefulness, and cognitive testing in this period can provide information about the functioning of the brain during the prior sleep period. When subjects were tested across the night--before and after a night's sleep as well as immediately following forced awakenings from REM and NREM sleep--weak priming (e. g., thief-wrong) was found to be state dependent (p = 0.016), whereas strong priming (e.g., hot-cold) was not (p = 0.89). Weak primes were most effective in the presleep and REM sleep conditions and least effective in NREM and postsleep conditions. Most striking are analyses comparing weak and strong priming within each wake-sleep state. Contrary to the normal pattern of priming, subjects awakened from REM sleep showed greater priming by weak primes than by strong primes (p = 0.01). This result was seen in each of three protocols. In contrast, strong priming exceeded weak priming in NREM sleep. The shift in weak priming seen after REM sleep awakenings suggests that cognition during REM sleep is qualitatively different from that of waking and NREM sleep and may reflect a shift in associative memory systems, a shift that we hypothesize underlies the bizarre and hyperassociative character of REM-sleep dreaming. Known changes in brainstem activity that control the transition into and maintenance of REM sleep provide a possible explanation of this shift.

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Many past examinations of memory changes in individuals with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have focused on changes in memory for trauma. However, it is unclear if these mnemonic differences extend beyond the memory of the trauma to memory for other positive and negative information and if they are specific to individuals with PTSD or extend to other individuals who have experienced trauma. The present study examined the influences of trauma exposure and PTSD on an effect that may parallel tunnel memory in PTSD: the emotion-induced memory trade-off, whereby emotional aspects of an experience are remembered at the expense of the nonemotional context. Three groups of participants (25 with current PTSD, 27 who had experienced trauma but did not have current PTSD, and 25 controls who had neither experienced significant trauma nor met criteria for current PTSD) were shown complex visual scenes that included an item (positive, negative, or neutral) placed on a neutral background. Forty-five minutes later, participants underwent a recognition memory test for the items and backgrounds separately. An emotion-induced memory trade-off was said to occur when there was a significant difference in item and background memory for emotional scenes, but not for neutral scenes. Results indicated that people with PTSD, like the other groups, were more likely to remember positive and negative items than neutral items. Moreover, people with PTSD exhibited a memory trade-off comparable in magnitude to that exhibited by the non-trauma control group. In contrast, trauma-exposed people without a current diagnosis of PTSD did not show a trade-off, because they remembered items within scenes better than their accompanying contexts not only for emotional but also for neutral scenes. These results suggest that (1) the effect of emotion on memory for visual scenes is similar in people with PTSD and control participants, and (2) people who have experienced trauma, but do not have PTSD, may have a different way of attending to and remembering visual scenes, exhibiting less of a memory trade-off than either control participants or people with PTSD.