This study documents a positive and robust effect of co‐opted boards on firm innovation. This effect is mainly driven by co‐opted independent directors. Firms with more co‐opted independent directors are associated with lower sensitivities of CEO pay and turnover to performance. It suggests that co‐opted boards promote innovation by insulating managers’ career concerns from innovation risk and supporting incentive contracts that motivate innovation. Overall, our study provides new evidence on co‐opted boards benefiting firm innovation.
We examine whether corporate decisions such as share repurchases influence a firm's intangible assets and their production. We find a significantly negative relationship between share repurchases and firm innovation. The negative relationship survives all considered robustness tests. We further apply two identification strategies, namely, difference-in-differences analysis and instrumental variables estimation, to establish that the negative effect is causal; that is, from share repurchases to innovation.
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