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-This paper develops two models of two-part tariff competition. When consumers are differentiated à la Hotelling, equilibrium prices equal marginal cost if and only if the demand of the marginal consumer equals the average demand. Entry fees are socially optimal in a symmetric equilibrium if all consumers participate in the market. Two-part tariffs tend to result in lower prices, higher profits and social welfare relative to uniform pricing. In the logit model, marginal cost pricing holds but entry fees are higher than socially optimal, and two-part tariffs lead to lower aggregate net consumer surplus but higher profits than uniform pricing. JEL Classification: D21, D42, D43, L11-L13

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We study the impact of the 2007-2008 financial crisis on nonfinancial firms' financing and investment activities and the role of corporate governance in alleviating the adverse consequences of the external capital supply shock. Employing a difference-in-differences research design, we find that better governance mitigates the disruption caused by the bank credit supply shock to firms' financing and investment activities. A variety of robustness tests suggests that our findings are unlikely to be driven by an endogeneity problem. We also obtain similar results when we extend the sample period to include the delayed spillover from the banking sector to other capital market sectors. JEL classification: G01; G31; G32; G34