We carried out an assessor-blinded, randomized controlled trial. The 24 participants were randomly allocated to either SPT or VST (n = 12 each). They received 20 treatment sessions lasting 30 minutes each at the bedside over 4 weeks. Outcome measures included the Functional Neglect Index (FNI) based on 4 tasks: find objects on a tray, stick bisection, picture search, and gaze orientation. In addition, the Unawareness and Behavioral Neglect Index (UBNI) with 6 items about unawareness and 4 about neglect in activities of daily living, the Help index (required assistance in 10 functional activities), the Barthel Index, and the rehabilitation phase were rated by treatment-blinded assessors. Outcome measures were obtained before and immediately after the end of the interventions and at a 2-week follow-up. Results Significantly greater improvements were obtained after SPT versus VST treatment in the FNI and UBNI, and there were continued improvements selectively in the SPT group 2 weeks later. Conclusions SPT accelerates recovery from functional neglect and reduces unawareness significantly. Bedside neglect treatment using SPT is effective and feasible early after stroke.

A popular view in philosophy of science contends that scientific reasoning is objective to the extent that the appraisal of scientific hypotheses is not influenced by moral, political, economic, or social values, but only by the available evidence. A large body of results in the psychology of motivated-reasoning has put pressure on the empirical adequacy of this view. The present study extends this body of results by providing direct evidence that the moral offensiveness of a scientific hypothesis biases explanatory judgment along several dimensions, even when prior credence in the hypothesis is controlled for. Furthermore, it is shown that this bias is insensitive to an economic incentive to be accurate in the evaluation of the evidence. These results contribute to call into question the attainability of the ideal of a value-free science.

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Explanation is a central concept in human psychology. Drawing upon philosophical theories of explanation, psychologists have recently begun to examine the relationship between explanation, probability and causality. Our study advances this growing literature at the intersection of psychology and philosophy of science by systematically investigating how judgments of explanatory power are affected by (i) the prior credibility of an explanatory hypothesis, (ii) the causal framing of the hypothesis, (iii) the perceived generalizability of the explanation, and (iv) the relation of statistical relevance between hypothesis and evidence. Collectively, the results of our five experiments support the hypothesis that the prior credibility of a causal explanation plays a central role in explanatory reasoning: first, because of the presence of strong main effects on judgments of explanatory power, and second, because of the gate-keeping role it has for other factors. Highly credible explanations are not susceptible to causal framing effects, but they are sensitive to the effects of normatively relevant factors: the generalizability of an explanation, and its statistical relevance for the evidence. These results advance current literature in the philosophy and psychology of explanation in three ways. First, they yield a more nuanced understanding of the determinants of judgments of explanatory power, and the interaction between these factors. Second, they show the close relationship between prior beliefs and explanatory power. Third, they elucidate the nature of abductive reasoning.