Brazil faces an enormous challenge to implement its revised Forest Code. Despite big losses for the environment, the law introduces new mechanisms to facilitate compliance and foster payment for ecosystem services (PES). The most promising of these is a market for trading forest certificates (CRAs) that allows landowners to offset their restoration obligations by paying for maintaining native vegetation elsewhere. We analyzed the economic potential for the emerging CRA market in Brazil and its implications for PES programs. Results indicate a potential market for trading 4.2 Mha of CRAs with a gross value of US$ 9.2±2.4 billion, with main regional markets forming in the states of Mato Grosso and São Paulo. This would be the largest market for trading forests in the world. Overall, the potential supply of CRAs in Brazilian states exceeds demand, creating an opportunity for additional PES programs to use the CRA market. This expanded market could provide not only monetary incentives to conserve native vegetation, but also environmental co-benefits by fostering PES programs focused on biodiversity, water conservation, and climate regulation. Effective implementation of the Forest Code will be vital to the success of this market and this hurdle brings uncertainty into the market. Long-term commitment, both within Brazil and abroad, will be essential to overcome the many challenges ahead.

In this paper, we consider whether an increase in uncertainty increases the value of a research and development (R&D) project. We also consider the related question of the impact of increased project uncertainty on the value of management flexibility, defined as the difference in value when the project is managed "actively" versus when it is under "passive" management. These questions have already been formulated in an insightful paper in the literature, where different sources of variability and uncertainty in R&D projects are identified and abandonment and improvement at interim stages are considered as options that provide management flexibility. We follow the same formulation. We derive a set of negative results that are contrary to the results of the above-mentioned paper and a set of positive results that are different from those presented. Our negative results indicate that when the source of variability is development uncertainty or market requirement uncertainty, one cannot make a general statement about the impact of increased uncertainty. In some cases, the value of flexibility (and project value) increases and in others it decreases. On the other hand, if the source of variability is market payoff, we show that increased variability increases either the overall project value or the project option value. If the increased variability of market payoff increases the "passive" value of the project, the overall project value also increases; and if it decreases the "passive" value, the value of flexibility, i.e., the project option value, increases.R&D projects, managerial flexibility, real options, option valuation, project management, dynamic programming

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