Based on a quadratic form of audit tenure in explaining audit quality, we estimate a reference point that is potentially optimal for audit firm rotation for 22 countries across legal regimes with high versus low levels of investor protection. We find that our estimate for the high investor protection regime is longer than that for the low investor protection regime (24 years vs. 14 years for our main measure). However, very few firms from our sample would have been affected if there were a requirement of a mandatory rotation term, suggesting that mandatory audit firm rotation may not be necessary. In additional analyses, we not only evaluate the empirical validity of the quadratic form but also use various measures of our key variables, to conduct several other robustness tests. We continue to find a longer optimal point for countries with stronger investor protection in these robustness tests. Our findings imply that stronger country-level investor protection is a substitute for a shorter term of mandatory audit firm rotation.

This study documents the timeliness of 10‐K filings on EDGAR between 1997 and 2018. Consistent with prior studies, we show that firms tend to file around the statutory filing deadlines. We find that 10‐K filings become timelier over time, especially after the statutory filing deadline changes. Prior to deadline changes, we find early filers tend to be dormant state companies, shell companies, development stage companies, or financial entities, such as trusts, asset‐backed securities, mortgage certificates, and funds. Most of these early filers have little or zero assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses. After deadline changes, however, we find firms with large market capitalization and better financial position and performance also report 10‐Ks early, indicating that early filers are not a random sample in recent years. Finally, we show that the changes of filing deadlines increase the number of early filers, but do not affect the proportion of late filers.

Purpose This study aims to examine the moderating effect of audit firm tenure on the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm value. Prior studies provide mixed results on this association, which may be due to differing theoretical expectations related to CSR and firm value. It is also possible that external stakeholders are unable to differentiate between positive and negative CSR investments, as CSR reports are generally not assured by independent third parties. Thus, the authors propose that audit firm tenure may be used by external stakeholders to evaluate CSR performance. Design/methodology/approach The authors use an ordinary least squares regression to examine the moderating effect of audit firm tenure on the relation between CSR and firm value after controlling for other determinants of firm value and various internal and external governance mechanisms documented in the literature. The sample consists of 15,707 firm-year observations from US firms during the sample period of 2000 to 2012. The authors measure CSR quality using rating scores from MSCI ESG STATS (formerly the KLD database), audit firm tenure as the number of years the incumbent auditor has served the client and firm value using Tobin’s Q. Findings The results indicate that CSR is positively associated with firm value when audit firm tenure is long but not when tenure is short. The results are robust to alternative measures of firm value, CSR performance scores, and individual CSR dimensions. The evidence supports the argument against mandatory audit firm rotation in the USA. Research limitations/implications Future studies could examine a similar issue in alternative settings and/or look at cross-sectional variations among firms on the association between CSR and firm value by other auditor traits such as auditor industry specialization and big-name reputation. Additionally, as auditor alone is unable to ensure the quality of management disclosures and their accountability, future studies could examine the moderating effect of internal and other external governance mechanisms on the association between CSR and firm value, exploring when the signaling effect of auditor tenure on CSR reporting quality and its effect on firm value is most salient. Practical implications The findings are important to regulators and investors. The authors provide evidence that longer audit tenure serves as a signaling device for external investors with regard to the quality of a firm’s CSR performance. Hence, the study facilitates regulators’ cost-benefit analysis related to mandating audit firm rotation. The evidence suggests that mandating a term limit on auditor tenure may have the unintended consequence of eliminating a signaling effect of auditor tenure on the quality of CSR disclosures under information asymmetry. This supports the Public Company Oversight Board’s decision to forgo the requirement of mandatory audit firm rotation in the USA. Originality/value Prior literature presents mixed findings on the association between CSR performance and firm value based on a variety of underlying theories (economic, stakeholder and contingency theory). Literature on mandatory auditor rotation has concentrated on the auditor tenure effect on perceived and actual audit quality as reflected in earnings quality. Relying on agency theory, this study posits that auditor tenure serves as a signal for the quality of CSR activities in the absence of CSR assurance reporting as CSR quality can be difficult to evaluate. The authors provide evidence that audit tenure moderates the association between CSR activities and firm value and longer audit tenure makes it more likely that the CSR activities are associated with increased firm value.

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