This study examines when firms inflate reported cash from operations in the statement of cash flows (CFO) and the mechanisms through which firms manage CFO. CFO management is distinct from earnings management. Unlike the manipulation of accruals, firms cannot manage CFO with biased estimates, but must resort to classification and timing. I identify four firm characteristics associated with incentives to inflate reported CFO: (1) financial distress, (2) a long-term credit rating near the investment/non-investment grade cutoff, (3) the existence of analyst cash flow forecasts, and (4) higher associations between stock returns and CFO. Results indicate that, even after controlling for the level of earnings, firms upward manage reported CFO when the incentives to do so are particularly high. Specifically, firms manage CFO by shifting items between th estatement of cash flows categories both within and outside the boundaries of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and by timing certain transactions such as delaying payments to suppliers or accelerating collections from customers. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the study.

We examine the relative accuracy of management and analyst forecasts of annual EPS. We predict and find that analysts' information advantage resides at the macroeconomic level. They provide more accurate earnings forecasts than management when a firm's fortunes move in concert with macroeconomic factors such as Gross Domestic Product and energy costs. In contrast, we predict and find that management's information advantage resides at the firm level. Their forecasts are more accurate than analysts' when management's actions, which affect reported earnings, are difficult to anticipate by outsiders, such as when the firm's inventories are abnormally high or the firm has excess capacity or is experiencing a loss. Although analysts are commonly viewed as industry specialists, we fail to find evidence that analysts have an information advantage over managers at the industry level. The two have comparable abilities to forecast earnings for firms with revenues or earnings that are more synchronous with their industries. * Boston College, Carroll School of Management. Accepted by Douglas Skinner.We are grateful to the editor and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions. We thank workshop participants at

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We examine how corporate social media affects the capital market consequences of firms’ disclosure in the context of consumer product recalls. Product recalls constitute a “product crisis” exposing the firm to reputational damage, loss of future sales, and legal liability. During such a crisis it is crucial for the firm to quickly and directly communicate its intended message to a wide network of stakeholders, which, in turn, renders corporate social media a potentially useful channel of disclosure. While we document that corporate social media, on average, attenuates the negative price reaction to recall announcements, the attenuation benefits of corporate social media vary with the level of control the firm has over its social media content. In particular, with the arrival of Facebook and Twitter, firms relinquished complete control over their social media content, and the attenuation benefits of corporate social media, while still significant, lessened. Detailed Twitter analysis confirms that the moderating effect of social media varies with the level of firm involvement and with the amount of control exerted by other users: the negative price reaction to a recall is attenuated by the frequency of tweets by the firm, while exacerbated by the frequency of tweets by other users.