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This article poses the question, 'Who is the expert?' in relation to people with intellectual disabilities. It begins with an exploration of what it means to assert moral authority in relation to people with IDs, and makes the argument that 'experts' who draw moral boundaries, define conceptions of the 'good' and quality of life for people must consider how to occupy this position responsibly. It then considers a second form of authority -epistemic authority -and explores the moral responsibility that accompanies the practice of putting forth knowledge claims about ID. This involves acknowledging three potential problems: distancing, oppression and dehumanization. The article concludes with questions that point towards greater interdisciplinary dialogue regarding authority, responsibility and the role of the expert.

Our analysis reveals various concerns and further questions related to the role that substantive values play in the assessment of QoL. It also draws response shift into a wider arena, with broader issues of interpretation, self-evaluation, the meaning of the 'good life', and the status and legitimacy we accord to various scientific methods.

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