This document is the author's post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from it.

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This article uses a leadership as process framework to examine the degree of mutuality that existed between EU and Kenyan responses to Somali piracy between roughly 2008 and 2012. In so doing, it seeks to comprehend whether regional and extra-regional actors had similar experiences of and responses to the situation. This is important because the voices of regional actors are largely marginalised and implicitly subsumed to those of more powerful global actors. This article focuses on the EU (as an extra- regional actor) and Kenya (as a regional actor). It undertakes an analysis of official and non-official documents available in the public domain to understand the interactions and exchanges of influence that underpinned the crafting and implementation of counter piracy measures. Overall, the article concludes that the EU and Kenya had different experiences of the piracy threats which then led to them each having different sets of priorities. On paper there seems to be mutuality between the EU and Kenya concerning the naval response: the need to solve the problem on land in Somalia and capacity building in the region. However, an analysis of interactions surrounding their counterpiracy measures reveals a more complex picture of discords. This article shows that, in fact, there was a low degree of mutuality between EU and Kenya in their responses to Somali piracy which hindered the formation of a strong common response incorporating regional and extra-regional actors.

Mauritius is usually portrayed as one of the most democratic countries in the world and a symbol of good governance. In the COVID-19 context, it is also cited as one of the very few countries that has successfully halted local transmission of the virus. While this reputation is deserved to some extent, there are very real governance issues and undemocratic tendencies that are experienced by its people but rarely captured by outsiders. Using documentary analysis, this article draws from the COVID-19 context to provide a different view of governance in Mauritius. It shows that Mauritius has longstanding governance issues and points out that the government that came to power in 2014 has had a pronounced autocratic tendency that has exacerbated these governance issues. However, no major protest occurred because it was able to balance public outcry with populist measures. The responses to the pandemic acted as a magnifying glass on those governance issues and the new socio-economic situation created by the pandemic neutralised the effect of populist measures. This, in turn, generated an explosive context worsened by another event like the Wakashio oil spill that led to an emerging citizen's movement that holds the potential to fuel reforms of the country's ailing governance.

This document is the author's post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from it.